Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)

My Lords, I shall speak first to the amendments in this group that stand in my name and then to those tabled by my noble friends. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, helpfully outlined a list of banana skins or uncertainties from her experience, such as the cost of changes in employment contracts and payroll software and of dealing with employees concerned about the change. She was right to ask whether we need to legislate so rapidly given the complexities that seem to be thrown up by today’s useful debate. My amendments, Amendments 5 and 18, helpfully supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, chiefly concern the principle of parliamentary oversight. Nothing is more central to our work. Under Clauses 1 and 2, the Bill quite properly provides that regulations reducing the £2,000 contributions limit must be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. That is right. If the Treasury lowers the cap, Parliament must be given the final say. What the Bill does not provide is affirmative scrutiny where the Treasury alters the methodology by which the cap is calculated or applied. That omission is significant because new subsections (6C) and (6D) do not deal with minor technical points but determine how the policy will operate in practice for thousands of earners whose pay patterns do not fit a neat monthly model. Let us look at new subsection (6C). It permits regulations to prescribe an equivalent contributions limit for those paid weekly or at other intervals. That phrase “other intervals” is remarkably broad. It covers shift workers, contractors, seasonal workers, gig economy participants, those on irregular pay cycles and those with multiple employments. People in these forms of employment make up a large and growing segment of the modern labour market, yet the detail of how the limit will be translated for those individuals is not in the Bill. It is left entirely to regulations and consultation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said. The annual cap is scrutinised in primary legislation, but, inconsistently, the translation of that cap into weekly, irregular or non-standard pay structures, the arrangements when an employee moves and other detail of importance to both workers and those operating payrolls, are to be set out later in regulations without the same degree of parliamentary approval. These points can be material in terms of compliance costs and fairness. In other words, those whose circumstances fit most neatly within the annual framework benefit from full parliamentary scrutiny, while those whose pay patterns are more complex do not. We submit that if the methodology by which the cap is applied to those workers is altered in a way that materially changes who pays and how much, that is a policy decision and one which requires greater scrutiny from your Lordships’ House and the other place. The same concerns arise under new subsection (6D). There, the Treasury is given powers to determine by regulation when amounts treated as remuneration are deemed to be paid, in prescribed cases to treat a figure other than the amount foregone as remuneration and to calculate that alternative figure in such manner and on such basis as may be prescribed. These are extremely broad powers. They allow the Treasury not merely to administer the cap but to redefine how remuneration is attributed and calculated for NICs purposes. If such methodological changes can be made without returning to Parliament for affirmative approval, the House will have ceded oversight of important mechanisms that determine the real-world effect of this new policy. My amendments simply make the point that where the method by which the contributions limit is calculated or applied is altered, Parliament should have the opportunity to approve the change. The Committee is currently scrutinising the Bill line by line. We are examining the consequences. It would be inconsistent if, once enacted, substantial changes could be introduced through regulations subject only to the negative procedure. If the Government are confident that any such changes would be technical and uncontroversial, they should have no objection to subjecting them to affirmative scrutiny. These provisions will affect real employers and real employees. They will determine compliance burdens, payroll calculations and the effective tax treatment of pension saving. They are not trivial matters. In short, where the substance of the policy shifts, Parliament should be asked to approve that shift. I hope the Minister will recognise that this is a sound and serious constitutional point and give it proper consideration. Amendments 4 and 17, tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, make an interesting case. The Government’s policy intent, as set out in the Explanatory Notes, is to apply a national insurance change where pension contributions are made pursuant to optional remuneration arrangements—in other words, where an employee has chosen to forgo cash pay in return for an employer pension contribution. However, there are some workplace pension arrangements where no such option exists: the employee is not offered a cash alternative, there is no choice between salary and pension, and the employer contribution is simply part of the structured remuneration package. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the arrangements can properly be described as optional. There is no alternative compensation available and there is no optionality. The amendment therefore makes clear that where no cash alternative is offered, the arrangement should not be treated as an optional remuneration arrangement for the purposes of the new NICs charges. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether arrangements with no genuine cash alternative are intended to fall within the scope of the Bill. If not, I hope he might look favourably on this clarification. My noble friend Lord Leigh’s Amendment 33 makes a further important point that the Bill should not come into force until the Treasury has published clear guidance setting out how the contributions limit will apply in cases of multiple concurrent employments. This is a matter of basic administrative clarity and fairness. The question about two caps for two jobs came from my noble friend himself, and it would be interesting to know the answer. My noble friend Lord Mackinlay doubts whether guidance is the right route, and wants to know what the arrangements will be today, with amendments to the Bill if we believe—in the light of the answers—that that is needed. We certainly need clarity, a change to the scrutiny of regulations to the affirmative, and perhaps guidance when we have the answers. Finally, I turn to Amendment 4A in the name of my noble friend Lord Fuller. As drafted, the Bill introduces a flat £2,000 annual limit, above which salary sacrifice to employer pensions will attract national insurance. It is a hard cap. But real earnings do not operate in neat annual instalments; for many people, remuneration fluctuates significantly from year to year. Without any carry-forward mechanism of the kind well articulated by my noble friend Lord Mackinlay, which is apparently not very costly, the Bill creates a cliff edge. An individual who sacrifices modestly for several years but has a single high-earning year will be treated as if that year existed in isolation. That is not how pension saving works elsewhere in the tax system. The pensions annual allowance regime already provides a three-year forward framework. Amendments 4B and 17B would align the national insurance treatment with that established precedent. The alternative amendments, Amendments 4A and 17A, simply provide the Treasury with a permissive power to introduce such a mechanism. They offer flexibility should Ministers be concerned about immediate fiscal implications. Amendment 29A would require an independent review within 18 months of implementation. The Bill introduces a new compliance framework affecting payroll systems, remuneration design and pension planning. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable that Parliament should require evidence of its real-world impact, particularly on fluctuating earners and on employer administrative burdens. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that the extra burden of complexity on employers can be dismissed, particularly now we have heard that currently there is so little interaction between second and third employers. We want fewer burdens, not more. Enough is enough, and I look forward to a proper and detailed response on these very important technical points.