Lord Goldsmith (Lab)

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to debate the International Agreements Committee’s two reports on the related topics of the UK-US mutual defence agreement and the AUKUS agreement. I thank the Government for making the time available for this debate. I will start with the MDA, which entered into force in August 1958. I am looking forward to this debate, particularly because it includes some new members of the committee; I am very pleased to welcome them to the committee as well. The MDA has been amended several times since it entered into force in August 1958, most recently in 2014. It provides for the exchange of nuclear materials, technology and information relating to nuclear weapons, although it does not provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons themselves. It underpins the UK’s nuclear weapons programme, and as such is a key part of the special relationship. Despite the MDA being described as the cornerstone of the defence nuclear relationship between the UK and the US, amendments to the agreement in 1994, 2004 and 2014 were not subject to debate in Parliament or a Select Committee report. External stakeholders such as CND and the Nuclear Information Service have raised concerns about the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of previous amendments to the MDA and have called for a debate on the most recent amendments. I am therefore very pleased that we are having this debate today. The amending agreement should be considered in the context of key developments to the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The UK is currently in the process of modernising its nuclear capabilities and nuclear-powered submarines, aiming to replace its four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines with the new Dreadnought class from the early 2030s. A programme to replace the UK’s nuclear warhead was also confirmed in February 2020. In March 2024, the previous Government published a new Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, which sets out the long-term approach to investing in and developing the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The United States is also currently modernising its strategic nuclear capabilities. The amending agreement should also be considered in the context of particular concerns. Some commentators have criticised the MDA as it risks the UK appearing to become overdependent on the US in relation to developing an independent nuclear weapons programme. However, the Ministry of Defence told us that co-operation with the US is based on the understanding that the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent remains independent. Turning to the committee’s report, we make two main recommendations: two key conclusions, both related to the unsatisfactory arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of the MDA. First, we welcome the expectation that ratification of the amending agreement by the US will be completed within the terms of the current Administration and Congress. But we also observe how the thorough congressional scrutiny processes contrast starkly with the inadequacy of our own arrangements. The US began its process of ratification earlier than the UK. Under the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear co-operation agreement for two periods totalling 90 days of continuous session. That is 30 days of consultation with relevant committees and 60 days during which Congress has the opportunity to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval. The Ministry of Defence has indicated that the period for congressional review has now concluded. By contrast, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, or CRaG, Parliament has only 21 sitting days in which to scrutinise a treaty, take evidence and report on it, and hold a debate. Considering the MDA’s role in forming the cornerstone of the UK-US defence and security relationship, the committee particularly regretted the lack of sufficient time to take evidence on this important agreement. This is yet another example of the shortcomings of the CRaG regime. Noble Lords may be interested to know that the committee is currently considering and conducting an inquiry into how parliamentary scrutiny of treaties can be improved in future. We have commented on this in previous reports. In our second conclusion, the committee drew attention to a specific change in the amending agreement, which will potentially reduce the already scarce opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise the MDA. This concerns Article III bis, which provides for the transfer of non-nuclear parts, enriched uranium, special nuclear material and equipment. Article III bis is time-limited and has been renewed on a 10-year cycle since the 1980s. The requirement to approve revisions to Article III bis has also provided the opportunity for both parties to make further amendments to other parts of the MDA. Article 5 of the amending agreement amends Article III bis so that its provisions are “extended indefinitely”, with no requirement for periodic renewal. Given the strategic importance of UK-US co-operation at this critical time in replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent to maintain the country’s security, the committee is concerned at this reduction in scrutiny opportunities and calls on the Government to commit to providing a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years. That is a critical conclusion and recommendation of this committee. Having dealt with the MDA, I want to turn now to the committee’s report on the AUKUS agreement relating to co-operation on naval nuclear propulsion, which forms part of the broader trilateral defence and security partnership between the UK, the US and Australia. This agreement has been made under pillar 1. The first phase of the partnership focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Upon its entry into force, it will supersede the current exchange naval nuclear propulsion information agreement, which entered into force in January 2022. That agreement, which I shall call the ENNPI agreement, allowed for the exchange of information to facilitate an 18-month study into the delivery of a conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine capability to Australia. The committee reported on that agreement on 13 January 2022, drawing it to the special attention of the House, and a debate was held in Grand Committee on 17 January. The new agreement will allow the UK and US to support Australia in acquiring its first conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine fleet from the 2030s. As well as allowing the continued exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information, it will authorise the transfer of material and equipment relating to naval nuclear propulsion, including special nuclear material in complete welded nuclear power units. That will enable UK industry to support Australia in building a trilaterally developed submarine, incorporating technology from the UK, the US and Australia. The AUKUS nations have released a joint statement detailing the progress made since the announcement of the optimal pathway in March 2023. The specific progress includes: increased education and training of Royal Australian Navy personnel and specialised US and UK schools; increased industry training to build and sustain nuclear-powered submarines; and preparatory activities to build Australia’s capacity ahead of establishing the submarine rotational force-west by 2027—that is, the rotational presence of UK and US nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling. The committee welcomes the significant progress made in the delivery of pillar 1 of the AUKUS partnership. Nevertheless, we must also be mindful of some risks, as well as opportunities, highlighted by some defence commentators. For example, Dr Sidharth Kaushal, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, warned against the sale of the Virginia class to Australia appearing as a diversion of capacity from the US Navy and of the need to manage design trade-offs as well as human capital. Similarly, Andrew Dowse, the director of RAND Australia, outlined risks such as public perception challenges in relation to cost, nuclear proliferation and implications for the sovereignty of an Australian submarine fleet. I will briefly summarise the link between the MDA and AUKUS agreements and why we are debating both reports together today. The AUKUS submarine fleet will incorporate designs and technology from both the UK and US, so the MDA could have a key role in enabling the exchange of nuclear propulsion technology and information sharing between the parties. The AUKUS submarine will be based on the UK’s next-generation nuclear-powered submarine design and will include US technology based largely on the Virginia-class SSN, including nuclear propulsion technology and components, and a common vertical launch system and weapons. The Ministry of Defence, from which we took evidence, acknowledged that although they represent two separate agreements, the MDA added value to the AUKUS trilateral agreement and that, without the MDA, we would not have the ENNPIA or AUKUS pillar 1. Before I conclude and look forward to the debate, I thank the Ministry of Defence for its co-operation in assisting our scrutiny work. I thank my colleagues on the International Agreements Committee, a number of whom are here, for their hard work and support. I also thank the officials of the committee, who have to work on what I have already identified as a very tight timetable to prepare reports, briefs and drafts for us, a feature to which we must have regard when we look, as I hope we will, at a revision of CRaG. Finally, I thank those who offered us a slot for debate in Grand Committee within the CRaG period. I beg to move.