Lord Livermore (Lab)

It is a perfectly good outcome if the employer increases their contribution into an employee’s pension. That is something we want to achieve. On specifically how HMRC would view that, I am very happy to take that away, but I do not believe in any way, in what I am saying, that that is the intention of what we are doing. I will finish what I was saying. In those cases, standard employer pension contributions will continue to be fully exempt from national insurance contributions, exactly as they are now. Nothing in this legislation changes that position. For these reasons, the Bill already draws the correct boundary by relying on a well-established and familiar legal definition. It targets only those arrangements where an employee is given a choice between cash and pension provision, and it does not interfere with ordinary, non-optional employer pension contributions. I turn to Amendments 5 and 18 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham. These amendments relate to parliamentary scrutiny and procedure. I agree with noble Lords about the importance of maintaining strong parliamentary scrutiny, particularly where changes could affect individuals’ national insurance liabilities. That is an important principle and one that the Government share. That is why the Bill contains a series of safeguards to protect scrutiny and transparency. The Bill explicitly provides that, where regulations are used to reduce the generosity of the £2,000 limit—that is, where changes would lower the contribution limit and thereby increase the amount of earnings subject to class 1 national insurance contributions—those regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure. This ensures that any change which tightens the policy or increases liability is brought before Parliament for full scrutiny and approval. By contrast, where regulations are made simply to implement the policy, to set out administrative arrangements or to increase the £2,000 limit, thereby resulting in less national insurance being payable, it is standard practice for those regulations to be subject to the negative procedure. That approach reflects the well-established distinction between substantive policy changes and regulations which deal with administration or confer additional relief. This is not a new or novel approach. It follows the established precedent for regulations made under the existing powers in Section 4(6) and Section 4A of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 and the corresponding Northern Ireland legislation. In those cases, regulations of an administrative or beneficial nature have routinely been subject to the negative procedure. I also note that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has carefully scrutinised the powers in the Bill, including the proposed level of parliamentary scrutiny. The Committee has confirmed that there is nothing in the Bill that it wished to draw to the special attention of the House. Taken together, these provisions ensure an appropriate and proportionate balance: robust parliamentary oversight where the policy is made less generous, and a well-established, efficient procedure for setting out administrative detail and making changes that operate in favour of contributors.