Lord Livermore (Lab)

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Vere and Lady Smith, the noble Lords, Lord Young, Lord Holmes and Lord Wigley, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for raising these very important issues concerning the governance and management of the Crown Estate. I should emphasise again that the intention of the Bill is to afford the Crown Estate greater flexibility to ensure that it can successfully compete in commercial markets to deliver maximum benefits for the nation. The noble Baronesses, Lady Vere, Lady Smith and Lady Kramer, asked about the number of commissioners. This change reflects the growing diversity of the Crown Estate’s business and will ensure that the Crown Estate can meet best practice standards for modern corporate governance. This will help to broaden the diversity of the board and provide more breadth of expertise and capacity to enable the commissioners to operate more effectively in the constantly evolving business environment. The Bill provides for a maximum number of 12 commissioners, up from eight at present. However, within this limit, the exact number of commissioners serving at any one time will be in the light of advice from the Crown Estate’s board on where it considers additional board-level expertise would be beneficial to the business. I will start by addressing the issue of the appointment of commissioners to the Crown Estate’s board, reflecting on Amendments 12 and 22, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Vere and Lady Smith. Amendment 12, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, would require scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee or any successor committee of all future proposed commissioner appointments, including the chair, before any appointment can be made. Let me first emphasise that all Crown Estate commissioner appointments are governed by the Governance Code on Public Appointments. The code is clear that commissioners must be selected based on expertise and experience. As I have previously set out, the Crown Estate operates independently of the King and of government. Affording Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise potential appointments before they are made would significantly alter the appointments process, in a way that would change the relationship between the Crown Estate, government and Parliament. The Cabinet Office’s existing guidance on pre-appointment scrutiny is clear that it should apply only where posts play a key role in the regulation of actions by the Government, protecting and safeguarding the public’s rights and interests in relation to decisions and actions of the Government, or roles where organisations have a direct major impact on public life. It is the Government’s view, as it was of the previous Government, that the Crown Estate’s commissioner posts do not fit these criteria and that it would therefore be inappropriate to require pre-appointment scrutiny. It should also be noted that pre-appointment scrutiny of roles elsewhere in public life is limited largely to the role of chairs. Therefore, even if the Cabinet Office’s criteria were satisfied, it would be disproportionate and unusual for all commissioner appointments to be subject to such scrutiny. In addition, requiring pre-appointment scrutiny for non-executive commissioner posts, which are not high profile or public facing, may deter some candidates from applying. As I have set out, this would be inconsistent with existing pre-scrutiny arrangements, which are generally restricted to chair positions. Consequently, this might put at risk securing candidates of the necessary quality and calibre to the board and present a more fundamental risk to the overall management of the Crown Estate.