Contribution
My Lords, it is always a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. This Bill has more holes than Swiss cheese. I shall give noble Lords some examples. It promises to ban bonuses for senior executives but is silent on how the ban is to be implemented. Water companies can bump up basic executive pay and thereby eliminate the need for any bonus at all. Most water companies are part of large groups of companies and can offer multiple directorships to individuals, so no bonuses are necessary whatever. I hope that in her reply the Minister will tell us how this bonus ban will operate in practice.
The Explanatory Notes refer to a bonus ban for degradation of “financial resilience”. I know a thing or two about financial resilience, but there is no definition in the Bill and I have no idea whatever of what the Government mean by that. Again, I hope that the Minister will give us some ideas. How is this assumed financial resilience to be secured? Shareholders are already reluctant to invest. More debt will not increase resilience. Currently some 28% of the gross revenue of water companies is used to service debt payments. With higher debt that percentage would rise, which would destabilise companies. That leaves higher customer bills as the only option. After 35 years of abuse, that is simply not viable. Again, I look forward to some clarity.
The Bill promises to bring criminal prosecutions against some water company bosses but provides absolutely no criteria. How much sewage and how often does it have to be dumped to trigger an event for prosecution? There is no clue in the Bill. In any case, there is a backlog of 60,000 Crown Court cases, so the chance of any timely prosecution is slim. Perhaps the Minister has in mind some additional investment in the legal system. It would be good to hear that.
The Bill does not curb the payment of dividends. In March 2023, Ofwat said that it would
“stop the payment of dividends if they would risk the company’s financial resilience”.
To date, there have been no restrictions on dividend payments. Not a single water company discloses its distributable reserves, so we have no idea of their dividend- paying capacity anyway.
The Government are pinning their hopes on Ofwat, but Ofwat is not really up to the job. It has presided over the entire mess. It has not curbed financial engineering. Water companies continue to inflate their level of investment by capitalising interest and repair and maintenance payments. That is permitted by Ofwat. Ofwat systematically favours companies over customers. Anyone has only to look at how the pricing formula PR24 operates. Ofwat uses fictitious gearing ratios to enable companies to receive real excess returns. That should really be a criminal offence.
Ofwat cannot be trusted. It is too cosy with the water industry. Two-thirds of England’s biggest water companies employ key executives who have previously worked at Ofwat. Executives of water companies and regulators regularly meet in hotels and expensive private clubs to discuss their common position and how to quell public anger about bill rises and sewage dumping. This Bill does absolutely nothing to check collusion with and the cognitive capture of the entire regulatory apparatus.
On 5 September, the Environment Secretary said that
“customers will have the power to summon board members and hold water executives to account through new customer panels with teeth”.
Without a statutory base, customer panels will achieve absolutely nothing. In my view, at least 50% of the board of directors of any regulatory body and the regulated entity need to be directly elected by customers. Customers must also vote on executive pay. If they think executives deserve higher pay and bonuses, then they can award them. Let there be a bit of democracy. At least give people the power to check abuses. If the Minister has any objections to the democratisation of the water industry, it would be good to hear them.
The main aim of the Bill seems to be to prevent public ownership of the industry. It enables Ministers to restructure water companies and return the monopoly to the private sector, with the cost borne by customers and the public purse. Clause 10 empowers the Government to provide financial assistance that they may or may not ultimately be able to recover. This strategy cannot address the cause of the crisis, which is profiteering and cash extraction by water companies.
If the water industry had been in public ownership for the last 35 years, £85 billion would have gone into infrastructure instead of dividends. Interest payments on debt would have been much lower as the cost of government-backed debt is always lower than that borne by companies; that would have freed billions more for investment. But the Government oppose public ownership.
In response to an Oral Question from me on 23 July 2024, the Minister said that public ownership
“would cost billions of pounds”.—[Official Report, 23/7/24; col. 364.]
That seemed to imply that the Government had actually done some calculation. So I quickly followed it up with a Written Question seeking details of that calculation. All I got in response was a reference to the Social Market Foundation report of 2018. If any of my master’s students had written that as a dissertation, they would have been guaranteed a fail. It is a dismal piece of work commissioned by water companies. A former government adviser has said that that report has “virtually no intellectual substance”. The £90 billion quoted in that report is utterly incorrect. When taking over an industry, one buys only the equity, not the debt—and that is what it included.
In 2019, Moody’s said that the equity value of water companies was only £14.5 billion. Since then, lots of changes have occurred: most water company shares are junk or worthless. Debt is junk: some of the Thames Water debt is trading at less than 6p in the pound. The Government should let the companies collapse and bring them into public ownership at low price. That is how capitalism operates: if a company collapses, it does not get bailed out. Only public ownership can provide long-term stability and it ought to be done through a not-for-profit organisation. The cost of this can be loaded on to the acquired companies, as the private equity model does, or it can be recouped by issuing public bonds, ensuring that people actually own essential industries.
The Bill is delaying the inevitable and, naturally, I will help the Minister by tabling some amendments.