Contribution
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Barker. I thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing what has been a really balanced and thoughtful debate. I hope that the Minister has found it useful and will take lots of useful comments from it as the Government move forward with their plans. I welcome the opportunity to contribute to this important debate on firearms licensing and the reforms we need to strengthen public safety while retaining the trust of responsible shooting communities.
I begin with a case that has been referred to by hon. Members in this debate: the tragic Prosper case in Bedfordshire, which revealed serious vulnerabilities in our current licensing system. An individual, Nicholas Prosper, obtained a shotgun using a highly convincing forged certificate, which appeared legitimate to a lawful vendor. On the following day, he went on to commit a triple murder within his own family. That was on my doorstep in north Luton. Police later confirmed that he had also planned an attack on a local school, prevented only through the swift actions of Bedfordshire’s officers.
Just last week I again met with a member of the extended Prosper family—someone whose life has been utterly shaken by this tragedy. Listening to their grief, their unanswered questions and their determination that no other family should ever endure such devastation has shaped my contribution to this debate. It took courage for them to speak out and to speak to me about something so profoundly painful; I am grateful, and I am hopeful that their experience will help drive the reforms needed to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again.
For that family and for our wider community, change must be about preventing real, life-altering harm and ensuring that the system designed to keep people safe cannot be exploited again. It is important to acknowledge that that case was not an isolated vulnerability. There has been at least one further attempt to use a similar forged certificate; fortunately, it was spotted by a vigilant registered firearms dealer, whose professionalism prevented a potentially catastrophic situation. However, we cannot depend on vigilance and instinct alone—public safety must rest on systems, not luck.
At the centre of this issue lies the national firearms licensing management system. It is an outdated platform, unable to provide real-time certificate validation and no longer fit for the demands placed upon it. The Home Office is now tendering for its replacement, which is expected in mid-2027.
Crucially, the new system will introduce real-time online certificate verification, akin, in my mind, to the MOT checking service that people are familiar with, and is strongly supported by the police, licensing experts and responsible shooting organisations. The replacement platform will enable wider modernisation, new digital licensing formats, stronger anti-fraud measures and a public portal allowing certificate holders to update basic information themselves. Those changes will reduce pressure on police forces, improve data accuracy and support a move to a more efficient and secure licensing environment.
Serious concerns remain in the interim, however. The seven-day review mechanism is helpful, but it cannot eliminate the risks exposed in Bedfordshire and across the country. If a firearm is transferred before police notification, there is a dangerous window in which harm can occur. Bedfordshire police made clear to me in our interactions that the system must be capable of validating a certificate before the transfer proceeds, in order to make the secondary market much safer, and I agree.
Some have suggested that the solution lies in a far more radical structural change: merging the section 2 shotgun licensing regime with the stricter section 1 system used for rifles and higher-powered firearms. I understand why people reach for a radical change in the wake of tragedy—it happens after every tragedy, and we have the strictest gun laws in the world as a result. Constituents understandably want reassurance and decisive action to ensure it never happens again, but the evidence simply does not support the approach being proposed by Government, for all the reasons explained by hon. Members here today.
Shooting organisations and licensing specialists tell me that merging section 1 and 2 would not materially improve public safety. Both regimes already require rigorous background checks, suitability assessments and medical scrutiny. Tragedies have arisen from failures in the system, outdated technology and administrative gaps, not from the distinction between certificate types. A merger would generate significant unintended consequences: increased strain on already overstretched police licensing teams, slower processing times, higher costs for responsible shotgun owners, and damage to rural economies, game management and conservation work.
At the same time, I must highlight the unacceptable licensing delays that residents and shooting organisations consistently report—delays that are particularly acute in my Mid Bedfordshire constituency, which falls under the Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire firearms licensing unit. That unit is now formally recognised as the worst performing in the country: some applicants are waiting up to two years for renewals or grants, placing livelihoods, rural businesses, conservation activity and community clubs under real pressure.