Lord Clement-Jones (LD)

My Lords, I offer our strong support for Amendments 9, 11, 24 and 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, and Amendments 5 and 10 in the name of my noble friend Lord Mohammed. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for his Amendment 4, because it, in essence, sets the theme of this group, which is the dashing of legitimate interests for this year, which a number of noble Lords explored. Before I address the specific mechanics of these amendments, we need to thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, and other noble Lords who highlighted at Second Reading the whole question of the protracted failure in long-term workforce planning. For years, we have seen a disconnect between the number of medical school places and the number of specialty training posts. There is a bottleneck of our own making: 12 applications for one post is a disaster. My late wife trained in the 1970s and became a registrar at Barts. I have no recollection of it being anything like on this scale, and we risk dashing the expectations of many of those currently in training. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, noted at Second Reading, the Bill does not widen the bottleneck; it simply reshuffles the queue. Although we on these Benches accept the principle that UK graduates should not face unemployment after taxpayer investment, we must ensure that, in correcting one failure, we do not commit a second failure of fairness against those have served our NHS in good faith. These amendments address one of the greatest injustices in this Bill: the decision to implement major changes mid-cycle for 2026, using the blunt instrument of indefinite leave to remain as a proxy for experience. The Government claim that assessing actual NHS experience is “not operationally feasible” for the 2026 rounds. Since Second Reading, we have received compelling evidence to the contrary. As my noble friend says, we have heard from doctors currently using the system who confirm that the Oriel recruitment platform already captures data on “months of NHS experience”. The question is there; the data exists. The claim that this cannot be done is a choice, not an administrative necessity. By refusing to use this data, Clause 2 creates a perverse experience gap. It excludes doctors who have served on our NHS front lines for two or three years but who have not yet reached the five-year threshold for settlement. We have received hundreds of emails detailing the human cost of this decision. We heard from a mother who lived apart from her one year-old child for seven months to study the MSRA exam, only to find the rules changing days after she sat it. We heard from a neurosurgery SHO with two years of NHS service, who notes that this mid-cycle change renders his sunk costs unrecoverable. We have heard from a British citizen whose wife, a doctor on a spousal visa, is deprioritised, despite being a permanent resident. Amendments 9 and 11 offer the Government a lifeline. They are permissive—my noble friend’s amendments mandate the Government. The bottom line is that the Secretary of State should use the data we know Oriel possesses to prioritise those with significant NHS experience in 2026, just as they intend to do in 2027. To reject this is to choose administrative convenience over natural justice. I see the amendments at this stage as a probing opportunity. We need the Minister to explain in specific, technical detail why the existing Oriel data fields regarding employment history cannot be used to filter applicants for this cycle. If the Minister cannot provide a satisfactory technical explanation today, and if the Government resist this flexible approach, we will be forced to conclude that this is a choice, not a necessity. In that event, we may well need to return to it on Report.