Contribution
I thank Members and peers for the continued scrutiny of the Bill before us. Our task today is to focus on the limited outstanding areas of disagreement, although that should not detract from the consensus behind this Bill—behind the case for a better pension landscape that sees bigger, better pension schemes focused on delivering stronger returns for savers. On the issues that remain before us, I hope that Members and peers will see that we have listened to the points they have raised and brought forward amendments that directly address what we have heard, while of course holding to the core principles of delivering against the Labour manifesto, which was clear on our policy intent around scale and productive investment.
First, I turn to the reserve power on asset allocation. Last week I set out the Government’s case for such a power at some length, and I will spare the House a full repetition today—[Interruption.] I know, I know, but there is so much more to discuss. We will not have time to discuss the hair of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) if I offer a full statement.
In brief, since hon. Members have asked, there is a well-evidenced collective action problem in the defined-contribution pensions market. Providers want to diversify their asset allocations in their members’ long-term interests and in the interests of better pensions for savers, but they are clear publicly—and even more emphatically in private—that market dynamics, which focus on minimising cost rather than maximising long-term value for savers, are the single biggest barrier to doing so. That is not a theoretical risk; it is exactly why so little progress was made against the Mansion House compact under the last Government. The reserve power exists for the sole purpose of solving this problem.
Last week, we brought forward changes to make that absolutely explicit by writing the industry-set Mansion House accord targets into primary legislation through the 10% and 5% caps, and requiring any regulations to operate neutrally across asset classes. These were designed to make it clear in the Bill that the power can be used only in line with what the industry itself has committed to. The cap prohibits any move beyond the accord targets and the neutrality requirement rules out the possibility that any Government could direct investments into a particular asset or asset class.
As is plain, however, we have not yet reached agreement across the two Houses. Rather than simply restating our position today, the Government are bringing forward a further package of changes.
First, we are bringing forward the current sunset date for the reserve power from 2035 to 2032. The Mansion House accord commits the industry to reaching its targets by 2030, and bringing forward the sunset clause aligns the power more closely with that timeline. If the power has not been exercised by the end of 2032, it falls away entirely. Secondly, because the power has only one purpose, we are providing that it may be exercised only once.
Thirdly—I want the House to understand the significance of this—we are providing for not just the power but any effects of it to fully fall away at the end of 2035. That goes beyond the sunset clause I have just described and means that even if the power has been used, the entire framework and any requirements on schemes will fall away at the end of 2035. This timeline reflects the fact that once the cultural shift has occurred and the impacts of the Mansion House accord are embedded, the collective action problem falls away. At that point, other elements of the Bill—greater scale and the impacts of the value for money framework—will help to sustain the change.
I want to return to a point made by the hon. Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately) in our previous debate. She observed correctly that the Bill referred to assets held in default funds as a whole, whereas the Mansion House accord applies only to main default funds. As the policy is intended to reflect the accord, the legislation would ideally use the same language, so we have tabled amendments to ensure that that is the case throughout the relevant provisions and have retabled the percentage cap with the same wording. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for pressing that point last week.
Let me be clear that the House today is being asked to consider a reserve power that is highly constrained and narrowly focused on solving a very specific problem. It is capped at the accord targets and provides for absolute neutrality among private asset classes. The Government cannot direct investments. The power explicitly applies only to main default funds, more explicitly matching the language used in the accord. The power’s timeline also matches tightly that of the accord. It can be used only once and lapses entirely in 2035 if not used; even if used, which is unlikely, the entire regime is repealed at the end of 2035. On top of all that, it remains subject to the savers’ interest test, the affirmative procedure and the statutory reporting requirements, both before and after any regulations are made.