Dr Luke Evans

In the immortal words of the famous film “A Few Good Men”: “‘I want the truth.’ ‘You can’t handle the truth!’” The court goes quiet. That is the moment of realisation that things have moved from process to accountability and responsibility. If hon. Members have not seen the film, it is about two marines who are on trial for killing another. The real story that unravels, however, is whether command can deny any responsibility for the actions that it has set in motion. Here lies the parallel. When subordinates act on the understood direction of authority, where does responsibility ultimately sit? They acted because of someone; it belongs to that person. Let us recount the facts that are not disputed in this House. Lord Mandelson was announced by the Prime Minister as the UK ambassador to the US in December 2024; UK Security Vetting recommended against developed vetting clearance in January 2025; the FCDO overruled that recommendation, enabling the appointment; the Prime Minister stated publicly that due process had been followed; and Sir Olly Robbins, the then permanent secretary, was later dismissed. However, what Robbins told us in the Committee in November 2025 is telling. “By the time we are describing, it was clear the Prime Minister wanted to make his appointment himself. Therefore, I understand the FCDO was informed of his decision and acted on it, and, via the Foreign Secretary, sought and obtained the King’s approval for the appointment. In this case, as Chris explained, the Prime Minister took advice and formed a view himself, and we then acted on that view.” The FCDO is clear: that was not drift; it was acting under direction. The Prime Minister formed that view and the FCDO acted on it—acting on instruction, acting on direction, acting on what the Prime Minister wanted. Yet since then, the Prime Minister has been trying to separate the decision and the consequence. There is the decision, there are the consequences, but we and the public know that we cannot separate the two. If an official acts in the shadow of a settled view, responsibility returns to the source, where the shadow was first cast. Let us draw some more comparisons with the film, because it is quite telling. Colonel Jessep does not issue the written order; the Prime Minister does not personally do the vetting. Subordinates act on a clear command and intent; the FCDO acted on the political intent. The defence by the colonel was that he did not order that; the defence by the Prime Minister was he was not told. The court finds that authority cannot be passive; we in this House say, “Neither can the Prime Minister.” The blame lands on the subordinates, and the same has happened here. In both cases, the controversy does not turn on the mechanics but on where the moral and constitutional responsibility resides. Officials were acting on a settled prime ministerial preference. The Prime Minister cannot have it both ways. He cannot have decisive authority on the way in and plausible deniability on the way out. That is not process; that is power without accountability. If the decision was his, is not the responsibility his? If not, why not, and whose is it then?