Contribution
My Lords, in moving Motion E, that this House do not insist on its Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88 and do agree with the Commons in its Amendments 88A to 88C, I will speak also to Motions F, F1, G, G1 and H.
Motion E deals with Amendment 15 and those connected with it, which sought to remove the reserve power on asset allocation from the Bill. The case for removing the power was pressed firmly in Committee and on Report, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and supported by a number of other noble Lords. The Government have always taken those arguments seriously, and I hope our response demonstrates that. However, the Government continue to believe that the reserve power is necessary.
The collective action problem in the defined contribution market, where competitive pressure on costs discourages providers from diversifying even when they recognise it would benefit their members, is well-evidenced and has been acknowledged by the industry itself. The Mansion House Accord represents a welcome voluntary commitment, but the risk is real that individual providers defer action until others move first. The reserve power exists to underpin those commitments, giving each provider confidence that the rest of the market will move too.
This collective action problem is not simply a theoretical concern or a government preoccupation. Last autumn, signatories to the Mansion House compact—a predecessor agreement on private markets investment, negotiated under the previous Government—published their own progress update. What was the single biggest barrier to delivering on their commitments? In their words,
“market dynamics continue to focus on minimising cost instead of maximising long-term value”,
and that without intervention to shift that culture,
“‘too much focus on cost’ remains the key barrier”.
That is the collective action problem in a nutshell: providers recognise that greater diversification can benefit their members but competitive dynamics hold them back from acting on it.
However, I gave undertakings during the passage of the Bill to reflect on the concerns raised by noble Lords, and I have done so. The amendments in lieu before the House today respond directly to those concerns in two important respects. First, the Government have placed a cap in the Bill so that regulations may require not more than 10% of default fund assets to be held in qualifying assets overall or more than 5% to be of a UK-specific description. This is a significant step. The Government have always been clear that the power is a backstop to the Mansion House Accord, which applies those specific targets to DC providers’ main default funds and no more.
I heard the argument—pressed particularly by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, in amendments that they tabled, with the support of others—that that commitment should be written into primary legislation rather than resting on ministerial assurance alone. This amendment does exactly that. It gives the industry and savers alike the confidence that no Government can use these powers to go beyond the accord’s percentage commitments.
Secondly, the Government have established a principle of neutrality between asset classes. These amendments remove the ability for regulations, should they try to do so, to weight the requirement towards any single category of private asset, and require that qualifying asset descriptions are prescribed across each of the private market categories set out in the Bill—so the Government could not, for example, concentrate the entire requirement in infrastructure, still less direct it into a particular sector or company. This responds to a type of concern expressed by noble Lords during the Bill’s passage about the breadth of the power and the risk that a future Government might use it for purposes unrelated to the accord. The neutrality requirement, taken together with the established principles of public law to which any secondary legislation must conform, provides a robust constraint against such misuse.