Lord Sandhurst (Con)

My Lords, Amendments 48 to 54, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, concern the operation of the victim contact scheme and the new helpline provisions introduced by the Bill, and in particular the Government’s decision to structure eligibility around the three-part categorisation of offences in new Schedule 6A. We welcome the Government’s intention to expand access to information for victims. The extension of the victim contact scheme and the creation of a statutory helpline represent important recognition that the victim should not be left in the dark about the progress, release or supervision of those who have harmed them. But the detail matters, and it is the detail of Schedule 6 that these amendments probe. Amendments 48 and 49 address the decision to confine the statutory rights under Section 35 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to victims of offences listed in Parts 1 and 2 of new Schedule 6A and subject, in the case of Part 1, to a specified custodial threshold. Amendment 48 would align Section 35 more broadly with new Schedule 6A as a whole, and Amendment 49 probes why the current drafting draws the line where it does. Noble Lords will have seen that new Schedule 6A divides offences into three parts. Victims of Part 1 offences qualify when the offender receives “a sentence of imprisonment … for a term of at least the specified … length”. Victims of Part 2 offences qualify without that same threshold. Other offences are treated differently still. The question before us today is: what is the principled basis for this threefold division? For example, Part 1 includes crimes such as wounding with intent to cause GBH, rape, aggravated burglary, abduction and child sex offences. Part 2 includes crimes such as stalking, coercive behaviour and putting people in fear of violence. It seems to us wrong that the latter list of offences does not include a custodial threshold for eligibility for the victim contact scheme, but the first list of offences does include such a threshold. The Minister said on Monday that use of the victim contact scheme is available for the “most serious cases”. Why, then, should the victim of, say, child sexual offences or abduction whose offender did not receive a sentence of imprisonment for a term of at least the specified sentence length be ineligible for the victim contact scheme? Following the Sentencing Act and subsequent reforms that were debated in this House, we have seen, and will continue to see, a marked shift in the sentencing landscape. Fewer people will receive immediate sentences of imprisonment, and sentences will be shorter. First, the automatic presumption for suspended sentences will mean that many offenders guilty of crimes under Part 1 of the new schedule—wounding with intent, rape and so on—may receive suspended sentences. That will make their victims ineligible for the victim contact scheme. This, frankly, is an insult to victims and the public. Part 1 is a shopping list of serious crimes for which there should be no restrictions on victims’ eligibility for the victim contact scheme. Secondly, under the Sentencing Act, the majority of offenders will be released after just one-third of their sentence. The practical consequence is that far more offenders than now are to be subject to supervision outside custody. That shift makes the victim contact scheme more, not less, important. The scheme is not a mere information line. It allows victims to make representations regarding licence conditions and, where they apply, parole decisions. In a world in which release and supervision decisions affect more and more cases, the ability of victims to engage meaningfully with those processes becomes essential to maintaining confidence in the system. The noble Lord, Lord Timpson, stated that the Sentencing Act will more or less double the number of people being tagged. That will mean that at least double the number of victims will want to engage with the victim contact scheme. Faced with these facts, it is difficult to see why eligibility should depend so rigidly on whether an offence falls into Part 1 or Part 2, or whether a custodial sentence crosses a certain line. From the perspective of the victim, the impact of the offence is not measured in statutory parts or sentencing thresholds. If the offender is subject to release conditions or to supervision in the community, the victim may well have legitimate concerns about notification, exclusion zones or contact restrictions. Those concerns do not disappear simply because the sentence imposed fell just a little below the specified sentence length. Amendment 50 turns to the new helpline. The Government have rightly recognised that some victims fall outside the formal victim contact scheme but nevertheless need access to information. The helpline is intended to fill that gap. However, as the Bill is drafted, it is still limited by reference to the categorisation in new Schedule 6A. If the purpose of the helpline is to provide a route for victims to obtain basic information about the offender’s custodial or supervisory status, why should it not extend to all victims of offences listed in new Schedule 6A? If Parliament has already determined that those offences merit inclusion in new Schedule 6A, what is gained by further subdividing access to information within that list? Amendments 51 to 53 similarly address the exclusion of victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences. As matters stand, victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences or community orders may not fall within the scope of the helpline in the same way as those whose offenders are in custody. Yet, arguably, it is precisely in such cases that victims will have acute and immediate concerns. An offender not in custody but serving a suspended sentence or community order remains in the community; the victim may live nearby. The potential for proximity, breach or renewed contact is real, not nugatory. I once again point out that it is government policy that the presumption for most of the offenders for whom this clause is relevant will be to receive suspended sentences. This automatically means their victims will not be able to access the helpline. If the Government are going as far as to legislate for a helpline, it should reflect the realities of modern sentencing. The distinction between custody and community supervision is no longer as clear-cut in terms of risk or impact. This is the result of the Government’s own legislation. A victim whose offender is under probation supervision in the community has every bit as much interest in knowing the conditions imposed and the mechanisms for enforcement as one whose offender is in prison. Finally, Amendment 54 probes the question of accountability. The Bill places duties on providers of probation services to take reasonable steps to provide information to victims about release, licence conditions and other relevant matters. That is welcome, but what is to happen if a victim believes that those reasonable steps have not been taken? It is not clear from the legislation what mechanism exists for review or appeal. Probation officers increasingly exercise functions that have a quasi-judicial character, particularly in relation to the formulation and management of licence conditions. This is once again due to the Sentencing Act. Where discretion is exercised, there should be some form of oversight. Amendment 54 proposes a modest and practical solution: that where a victim is dissatisfied, there should be a route to seek reconsideration by a senior probation officer. The Government no doubt accept that the existence of an appeals process is important. Indeed, it is a fundamental element of our judicial process. It does not seem right, therefore, that probation officers, who are already subject to fewer checks and balances and less public scrutiny, should be shielded from an appeals process concerning their decisions. These amendments ask the Government to explain the rationale behind the categorisation in new Schedule 6A, and to consider whether access to the victim contact scheme and helpline should better reflect the contemporary sentencing landscape. If we are serious about placing victims at the heart of the justice system, access to information and participation cannot depend on seemingly arbitrary distinctions. I beg to move.