Contribution
I beg to move,
That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88, insists on its amendments 88C, 88E to 88P, 88R, 88S and 88W to the words restored to the Bill by that disagreement, does not insist on its amendments 88A, 88T, 88U and 88V to the words so restored to the Bill, but proposes further amendments (a) to (j) to the words so restored to the Bill.
It is obviously disappointing to see that not every Member in this Chamber wishes to stay for a detailed discussion of the Pension Schemes Bill, but it is not the biggest disappointment ever. It is good to see our regular engagers on this Bill in their place. I thank in particular those Members for helpful discussions on the Bill in recent days.
I do not intend to detain the House for long. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That is the reaction we are always looking for. Members will be aware that there is one outstanding issue between this House and the other place when it comes to the Bill, and it relates to the reserve power on asset allocation. Today the Government return to their previous amendments on this issue. They spell out the intended purpose of the reserve power to underpin the industry’s own commitments in the Mansion House accord and to rule out other uses, such as a focus on any specific asset or asset class.
We are also bringing forward a final set of changes that aim to do justice to the points made in this House and the other place, while retaining the original policy intent. They have three elements. First, there is a new requirement on regulators—in this case, the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority—to make an assessment of barriers to the delivery of private asset investment, including the extent to which those barriers reflect the collective action problem, which we have discussed extensively in our exchanges on the Bill. That assessment would be required to be incorporated into the ex-ante report that the Secretary of State must produce before any use of the reserve power that the Bill provides for.
Importantly, our amendments also place on the Government a duty to have regard to this regulatory assessment before any use of the power. That will ensure that a Secretary of State behaving reasonably—as they are required to do—must place weight on the assessment of the regulators on this matter. It was always the Government’s intention to evaluate progress against the Mansion House accord commitments in terms of the broad direction of travel over a substantial period of time, rather than looking at short-term movements in private asset exposure. To reinforce that, we propose to add to the Bill that the power cannot be exercised any earlier than 2028.
Our second set of changes builds on the savers’ interest test to reinforce the central role of trustees and providers. Our amendments in lieu would change the bar required to engage the savers’ interest test. Rather than having to demonstrate that meeting the asset allocation requirements would be likely to cause material financial detriment, a scheme would instead have to show that meeting the requirements is
“likely not to be in the best interests of members”.
That reflects language regularly used when considering trustees’ duties. In addition, we have more tightly specified the regulators’ role, confining it to ensuring that the trustee or provider’s own assessment of what is in the best interests of members is “reasonable”, rather than replacing that assessment with their own.
Thirdly, our amendments address worries about the differential treatment of particular investment vehicles by allowing for consideration of direct or indirect holdings in the six asset classes named in the Mansion House accord.
I remind the House that the Bill has its roots in much work that was under way for some time in Government, but also in the commitment in the Labour party manifesto to ensure that workplace pension schemes take advantage of scale and invest in a wider range of productive assets. That is why one of the first things that the Government did on taking office was to launch a comprehensive review of pensions investment. That review found clear evidence that the defined-contribution pensions market is operating with an excessively narrow focus on costs, to the detriment of saver outcomes. That is where the reserve power comes from. It exists because the review found—and the industry itself has told us this, publicly and privately—that competitive pressure focused on cost minimisation is the single biggest barrier to diversifying in savers’ long-term interests.
However, things can of course change over time, and a range of other factors may come into play. We have discussed them with, in particular, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier). The changes that we propose today address directly that worry and others. They require regulators to assess whether these competitive pressures remain a material barrier to more diverse private asset investment before any use of the power, and they put trustees’ or providers’ own assessments of savers’ best interests centre stage.
On that basis, I commend the Government’s position to the House.