Hilary Benn

With permission, I will make a statement on the recent Supreme Court judgment in the case of Dillon and others. It is a complex judgment, but I thought it right to come to the House at the first available opportunity to summarise its main findings. The case was originally brought against the previous Government following the passage of the legacy Act—the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act—in 2023. The applicants, a group of families who lost loved ones during the troubles, argued that various provisions of the legacy Act undermined rights protected by article 2 of the Windsor framework and by the Human Rights Act 1998, which gives effect to the European convention on human rights. In February 2024, the High Court of Northern Ireland found the conditional immunity scheme and other provisions of the legacy Act to be incompatible with our obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights. Those findings were endorsed in September 2024 by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. It also made judgments that two additional matters with regard to investigations by the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery—namely, next-of-kin participation in investigations and the role of the Secretary of State in decisions about the disclosure of sensitive information—did not meet the standard required to be compatible with the ECHR. This Government have been clear that we are opposed to aspects of the legacy Act, including immunity. That scheme, which would have offered immunity to terrorists, had no support in Northern Ireland or from victims and their families. It was wrong in principle and provided no effective protections for veterans, not least because the provisions were never commenced by the previous Government. That is why, when we came into government, we immediately withdrew the appeal on immunity. However, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of article 2 of the Windsor framework and its findings on next-of-kin participation and disclosure had wider implications for the Government’s ability to legislate effectively across the UK and protect national security. It was for those reasons that the Government appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court. I am pleased to report that last week the Supreme Court upheld our appeal, finding wholly in the Government’s favour. Article 2 of the Windsor framework ensures that there is no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity in Northern Ireland as a result of the UK leaving the European Union. The Government are firmly committed to those human rights and equalities provisions but felt that article 2 had been interpreted too broadly by the lower courts. The Supreme Court’s judgment has provided important clarity on this question and confirmed the Government’s long-standing position that the rights protected by article 2 of the Windsor framework are those concerned with ending the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. While reaffirming the Government’s position on this matter, the Supreme Court found that the relevant provisions of the legacy Act should not have been disapplied by article 2 of the Windsor framework. The purpose of bringing the appeal was to obtain clarity on how article 2 should be interpreted in the future, not to defend immunity. On next-of-kin participation and disclosure of information, the Supreme Court found that the commission is currently capable of conducting investigations that are compliant with our obligations under the European convention on human rights. The Supreme Court also concluded that the provision of legal aid for the cross-examination of witnesses is not always necessary for an investigation to be fully compliant with human rights. However, the Government recognise the importance of next-of-kin involvement in the reformed Legacy Commission’s inquisitorial proceedings, and we are providing for that in the troubles Bill. On disclosure, the Supreme Court was unequivocal, saying that “there must be a system restricting disclosure in circumstances where disclosure may or would risk prejudicing the national security interests of the United Kingdom”, but it went on to say that “the Secretary of State does not have an unrestrained power to ‘veto’ the disclosure of information” and that “any decision to do so is subject to challenge by way of judicial review.” This Government are committed to ensuring the maximum possible disclosure of information while protecting life and national security, hence the changes I am bringing forward in the troubles Bill to create a fairer disclosure regime with greater transparency in how decisions are made. I now turn to what this means for the question of immunity. Contrary to what has been claimed by some, the UK Supreme Court has not endorsed the immunity scheme—it remains incompatible with our human rights obligations. It is also important to dispel the suggestion that the Government do not have the power to make the remedial order. As I have previously made clear, the conditions for laying a remedial order under the Human Rights Act are that: “An appeal brought within that time has been determined or abandoned.” The Government’s appeal regarding the immunity scheme in the legacy Act had already been abandoned. The Supreme Court recognised that, and therefore that was not an issue before it, but it did state very clearly that no exceptions in case law exist to justify the granting of immunity for breaches of articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Finally, I want to make clear why, although we welcome the Supreme Court’s determination of certain aspects of the legacy Act, we cannot leave the statute book as it is. The central underpinning of the legacy Act, which was the immunity scheme, was wrong and has failed, so we need a new system. The troubles Bill is essential for a number of reasons. First, while we know that the commission is capable of doing investigations, it has not delivered so far and it must be reformed. The Bill will implement various changes to address these matters, including reformed governance and enhanced investigatory functions. Secondly, we need the Bill to avoid endless legal disputes in future—for example, the clauses on interim custody orders will put beyond doubt that the Carltona principle applied in the context of those orders. The Bill will also ensure that all troubles-related cases can be investigated, one way or another. Thirdly, there is the issue of Irish co-operation. Currently, no information is being shared by the Irish authorities with the commission; the Bill will enable that to happen for the first time, helping to find answers for the relatives of those who were murdered, including service personnel who served our country. Fourthly, the Bill will enable information to be provided to families through the new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery. Fifthly, we need new and effective safeguards for our veterans and other former service personnel. Crucially, the legacy Act did not provide those protections, and we have developed them for veterans and others who served. As I have made clear, we will be bringing forward more provisions in Committee in response to veterans’ concerns. Simply returning to the legacy Act would leave veterans without immunity or any protections whatsoever. I am grateful to the Supreme Court for its careful consideration of these matters, and I welcome its judgment. I hope that the combination of this ruling and legislative progress on the troubles Bill will mean that all communities affected in Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom can have confidence that a reformed legacy commission will be able, where possible, to provide answers to those who have waited far too long to find out what happened to their loved ones. I commend this statement to the House.