Earl Russell (LD)

My Lords, this second group concerns different aspects of the operation and scope of the revenue certainty contracts. We appreciate the good intentions to influence the mix of technologies and feedstocks supported by this scheme, but we cannot support these amendments, each of which in a different way would introduce arbitrary restrictions that, while well intended, would risk upsetting the balanced, technology-neutral framework that is central to the Bill’s success. They would remove flexibility and could have serious unexpected consequences. The technological framework itself will attract the broad range of investments that will enable the rapid scaling of UK aviation fuel production. It is the creation of the revenue certainty mechanism that will attract investments, which are the literal fuel to bring the technologies we need. I will address each amendment in turn. Amendment 3 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would introduce a new subsection prohibiting revenue certainty contracts from providing payment for a PtL sustainable aviation fuel. I understand the concern that PtL technologies are still maturing and often come with higher upfront costs, but a statutory exclusion is too blunt a guillotine instrument. It would deny Ministers any flexibility to support promising PtL projects as costs fall and technologies advance, sending an unhelpful signal to developers and investors that this entire pathway is off limits for UK support. Such rigidity would involve diverting PtL investment to other jurisdictions. The Bill as drafted already provides the Government with tools to shape pathways through allocations criteria and contract design without foreclosing future opportunities. Amendment 7 from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, would take exactly the opposite approach, requiring the Secretary of State to direct the counterparty to offer minimum volumes of PtL contracts from 2028 onward, increasing annually to 2040. While the objective of accelerating PtL development is commendable, setting the number of strict time-fixed statutory quotas in the Bill would be equally problematic. It would commit the Government to contracting many time-fixed volumes whether or not sufficient viable PtL projects were ready, creating a risk of uneconomic awards or unfulfilled obligations on many occasions. As others involved in financing such large-scale projects know, they are often delivered slightly behind time as supply chains can be overrun. Building so many rigid volumetric obligations into the statute would create legal and commercial uncertainty and could crowd out credible SAF pathways. The Government’s more flexible approach, using competitive tenders and market readiness to guide allocation, remains a more practical and adaptable route. Amendment 14 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, seeks to define “relevant crops” as starch-rich crops, sugars, oil crops and main crops, adopting the same definitions as used in the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations Order 2007. Amendment 16, in a similar vein, would exclude from support any sustainable aviation fuel derived from such crops. I fully recognise the environmental concern to avoid diverting crops into fuel production, but legislating directly for this exclusion via statutory definition risks unintended consequences; for example, capturing advanced biofuels that use a mix of waste and feedstocks or deterring innovation where crop residues are responsibly utilised. The same aims can, we feel, be better achieved through policy guidance, sustainability criteria and a certification process already envisaged under the Bill, rather than through rigid statutory exclusion. As drafted, these amendments are overly prescriptive and would constrain technological evolution and government flexibility and discourage investment.