Mr James Frith

I will not, as I want to make some progress, and I am afraid there is still a lot to cover. On covid, several Members made excellent points about the need to recall, remember and learn from that damning period. One such example is the significant improvement made to our crisis response structures and capabilities in line with the recommendations made in the covid-19 module 1 inquiry. That included establishing the National Situation Centre in 2021 to improve the use of data in crisis response, creating a single Cabinet committee for resilience to ensure ministerial oversight. On the issue of education and resilience, we must provide excellent training, and exercising is also essential to ensure that individual sectors can work together to prepare for, respond to and recover from crises. The Government have also established the UK resilience plan. On the matter of AI, AI sovereignty is defined as the UK having resilient access to key AI capabilities. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) referred to the need to counter the increasing threats posed by AI that is housed and created away from these shores. Sovereign capability is vital, and the launch of the sovereign AI unit is vital as we transition towards that authority, as it will help the UK to win at strategically important parts of that value chain. Civil society also plays an important role in the UK’s resilience, including the many voluntary, community and faith sector organisations that contribute to community-level resilience and emergency planning. The resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure is of central importance to ensuring that the essential services on which the public rely continue to operate. Given the fundamental and connected nature of those services, failure has the potential to cause cascading and catastrophic consequences. The resilience action plan’s all-hazards approach, combined with the priorities in the strategic defence review, the national security strategy and the 10-year infrastructure strategy, underpins the Government’s commitment to improving the security and resilience of CNI. On smart devices and tech resilience, the Government take an actor-agnostic, risk-based approach to supply chain resilience. Instead of reacting to individual firms or components in isolation, we must focus on the structural choke points and systemic dependencies that create national-level vulnerability, regardless of where in the chain they are. While cellular modules present some specific cyber-threats, those can be mitigated in effectively the same way as any other cyber-risks. Therefore, existing work to strengthen our cyber-resilience will impact how vulnerable sectors and organisations are to threats via the cellular internet of things. In conclusion, the Government continue to regularly engage the public and parliamentarians on risk and resilience through our annual statement to Parliament, which gives a strategic overview of the current risk picture. The next annual statement will be made in July this year, and it will provide detailed updates on progress made to deliver against the commitments over the last 12 months.