Contribution
The hon. Member is exactly right. When the Committee published our report, we lamented that there was not a full-scale, full-blown implementation plan alongside the proposals. To a degree, those are difficult things to write, because it is difficult to forecast how quickly the treaty will go through the ratification process needed in India, for example, but we heard evidence that some markets—not least in automotives—had been chilled. Of course, if people know that there are huge tariff and price savings on the way, why would they not delay their purchase rather than make it today? We think that there could have been some wisdom in at least attempting an implementation plan, not least a resource plan that goes alongside the treaty—and perhaps even something tabled in time for tonight’s debate, to reassure the House that the Government will watch the implementation of this deal like a hawk.
The Select Committee has decided to go to India in March to understand how this deal will be implemented in real life. If our export support work is hollowed out, the consequences will be predictable: smaller exporters will walk away, utilisation rates for the treaty will remain low, and the headline gains will fail to reach the wider economy and benefit the constituents who sent us to this House to debate this treaty. I hope that the Minister will, as quickly as he can, rustle up an implementation plan to tell us how the agreement will be implemented. I very much hope that he will be able to align the ambitions for the treaty with the level of resource that he and his Department are investing in it.
The House will want to know that the Committee also tested the treaty against the deals secured by our allies in the European Union and the United States. Compared with the EU-India deal, it seems that the UK has moved faster and secured earlier liberalisation on some tariff lines. We have liberalised 92% of the value of our exports, while the EU has secured 96.6% of its exports, but both were for roughly the same level of market access offered to India—offers covering over 99% of India’s exports by value to the UK and EU markets.
The EU deal obviously covers a much wider volume of trade than we deliver with India, so the EU will therefore enjoy much bigger total tariff savings and a much bigger quota access, particularly for the automotive sector, among others. However, as the Opposition spokesman rightly flagged, there was limited progress on services—we flagged that, too. Services are the lifeblood of the British economy and of our exports—we are a services superpower. The EU’s negotiating position appears at first blush to be broader and deeper, but the final outcomes will remain unclear until the final text is published.
Compared with the United States, the contrast is different again. It appears that the White House has prioritised strategic leverage and tariff pressure over comprehensive liberalisation, extracting concessions through market power, not through traditional FTA approaches. The UK has chosen a different path: ruled-based, negotiated commitments and long-term engagement. I think that choice can work for us, as long as we are ruthless about ensuring good implementation.
We are sceptical about the level of services mobility that has been delivered, and about the absence of a bilateral investment treaty—we think that is a significant gap in our long-term framework. We also recognise that policy volatility and regulatory risk still matter. In particular, India’s record on investor protection remains uneven, and its tax administration is still too often used in a way that is, frankly, weaponised. Ensuring that we have good ways to monitor and escalate this will be important if the deal is to be a success.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) flagged up, some UK sectors, like textiles and ceramics, will face increased competitive pressure, and although the agreement does contain binding human rights provisions, the responsibilities of UK firms do not end at the border. Being strong on human rights protection, upgrading the dysfunctional Trade Remedies Authority and pressuring the Competition and Markets Authority to publish a foreign subsidy control regime would be extremely welcome.
The final point I want to flag is an issue that came up during the Minister’s appearance in front of the Committee, and I have not heard enough tonight or since he came to the Committee about its progress. The reality is that India remains one of the biggest customers of Russian oil. That money is fuelling Putin’s war machine, and as recently as January, His Majesty’s Government had not introduced controls that were in place in the European Union to ensure that oil derivatives made from Russian oil were banned from this country. Indeed, when Politico reported on this earlier in the year, it noted that something like one in six units of Britain’s aviation fuel imports were derived from Russian oil. That is not something that the Minister will want to tolerate for very long. For a long time, he has been one of the leading voices in the House in standing up to Putin and the evil of Russia, so I hope during the wind-ups he will say more about exactly what he is doing, along with his colleagues, to ensure that we are stopping the possibilities of importing Russian oil derivatives from India.
In conclusion, our overall take is that this is a good deal that is in the UK national interest, but I do want to supply one final note of dissent. When the CRaG legislation was introduced to the House in 2010, it was always the intention of Parliament that when free trade deals came for debate, there would be a votable motion. That would allow Parliament to exercise the licence that it was promised to delay ratification if it was discontent with the terms of an agreement before us. I am grateful to the Leader of the House and the Minister for ensuring that there is a general debate tonight, but it is not a debate on a votable motion. If this Parliament is to be a strong watchdog and guardian of the Executive, it is important that what were once prerogative powers are transferred to us, here in this House. I hope that this is the last debate on a free trade agreement that takes place on a general motion; in a democracy, we decide things by voting.