Dan Jarvis

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I begin by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing this debate. He did an excellent job of providing the context we need to have a good discussion, and the House owes him a service for the work he has done. I also extend my gratitude to all the hon. Members who have spoken—I will try to reflect on their comments in a moment—and, as others have done, I extend the Government’s gratitude to all those who signed the e-petition that has brought us here today. This has been a good, timely and useful debate and it provides an important opportunity to strengthen awareness of the threat, and to signal the resolve that exists across the House to confront the work of Russian threat actors. The Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs. That is why on 18 October last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors.[Official Report, 23 February 2026; Vol. 781, c. 2WC.] (Correction) Just last Thursday, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre in briefing the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. On Wednesday last week, I joined the Skills Minister and the directors general of MI5 and the NCSC in hosting nearly 100 representatives from universities and sector bodies to discuss the risks that they face from foreign interference. I am pleased to announce today that the Government will invest £3 million over the next three years to support the higher education sector to strengthen its resilience. That will include setting up a new foreign interference reporting route for UK universities and co-designing best practice guidance that will help universities to make proportionate, risk-based decisions on the threats to which they are exposed. As part of this work, we will also be considering the role of think-tanks, to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk referred specifically, given that they will share many of the same interference risks. This e-petition calls for a public inquiry into Russian influence in UK democracy. As the Security Minister, I am proud to have the opportunity to work very closely with our intelligence and security agencies, who are working tirelessly to monitor and disrupt Russian threats to UK politics. Those threats range from cyber-espionage operations targeting sensitive or classified information to divisive information operations and attempts to influence UK policymaking through bribery and coercion, as we have seen with the shocking case of Nathan Gill. Hon. Members will understand that it will not always be appropriate for the Government and our intelligence agencies to publicly reveal the extent of our understanding of Russian operations, due to the obvious importance of protecting the sources of that information and maintaining a competitive advantage over our adversaries. However, the UK Government continue to work tirelessly alongside our allies to expose Russian cyber-threats and information operations targeting democracy in the UK and worldwide. For example, since October 2024, the Government have exposed and sanctioned 38 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russian information warfare to undermine global democracies. The guidance that the National Protective Security Authority published in October also specifically highlighted the full range of vectors and tactics that foreign actors, including Russia, are using to target individuals working in UK politics. Indeed, in the light of the deeply concerning evidence of Russia targeting our democratic system, the Government commissioned Philip Rycroft to deliver an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review will primarily focus on foreign interference via funding because that is an area of particular concern. However, to inform his recommendations, Philip Rycroft has been provided with a threat briefing that covers the full range of vectors used by states to target UK politics. It is the Government’s position that launching a new inquiry at this time would be premature. It would risk prejudging the conclusions of the ongoing review and duplicating its efforts. However, the final report will be presented to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and to me by the end of March, after which there will be significant opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny and debate. Let me address some of the points that have been raised in this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked about cryptocurrency tools. As he will know, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 makes it clear that foreign money is not permitted in UK politics. However, as tactics behind foreign interference operations develop, the Government recognise that our response also needs to evolve. The UK Government therefore reaffirmed their leadership and resolved to stamp out corruption and dodgy money in UK politics through the Home Office’s refreshed anti-corruption strategy. Corrupt insiders and criminal networks will be brought to justice by a strengthened specialist police unit and tougher safeguards across the public sector. The forthcoming elections Bill will also further strengthen safeguards against covert political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties. The Rycroft review into foreign financial interference will assess opportunities for further improvement. Let me just say a word specifically about cryptocurrency, because the Bill specifically includes safeguarding against the potential use of cryptocurrency by foreign actors to obfuscate the source of their donations. My hon. Friend also asked about media literacy education. Building media literacy skills for young people to critically engage with and assess information from a range of sources is a priority for the Government. Since 2022, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has provided £3 million of funding for media-literacy projects that empower users to navigate the online world safely. My hon. Friend also asked about a dedicated disinformation agency. This issue will always require a co-ordinated, cross-Government effort. DSIT leads the Government’s policy on countering disinformation, but works closely with the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office. The Home Office is the departmental lead for state threats, working closely with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which leads on the Government’s efforts to counter foreign interference. A lot of meaningful activity is taking place across Government.