Contribution
My Lords, we turn now to a group of amendments that all relate to the exercise of delegated powers to amend future legislation—Henry VIII powers. They are powers by way of statutory instrument to amend primary legislation in the future. The relevant document—if noble Lords are interested to read it in detail—is the 45th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which reported on this Bill and drew the attention of the House to the Henry VIII powers.
Before I turn to precisely what it said, it did not note, but I have, that in Clause 88 there is a general power for making consequential and incidental provision relating to future legislation. Clause 88 says:
“Regulations … may amend or repeal provision made by an Act of Parliament passed before, or in the same Session as, this Act”.
My amendments do not affect that.
My Amendments 180A, 184A, 196F and 235DA in this group relate to Henry VIII powers to amend future legislation, which was the subject of the Delegated Powers Committee’s report. It said:
“It is reasonably common for Henry VIII powers to allow for consequential amendments to amend future Acts of Parliament passed in the same session as the Bill in which they appear … the Government and Parliament are capable of passing Bills in future sessions consistent with preceding legislation”.
It says in the next paragraph that in November last year the parliamentary counsel noted to the Constitution Committee that
“the power to amend consequentially Acts in future sessions is rare and normally specifically justified in the delegated powers [memorandum] … The Bill includes numerous instances of this type of power and the Memorandum”—
that is, the Government’s delegated powers memorandum—
“does not provide justification for any of them”.
It says, in the recommendations in paragraph 23 of the report:
“In the light of the Government’s failure to justify the ability of these Henry VIII powers to change the effect of Acts of Parliament to be passed in future sessions, we recommend to the House that the delegated powers in clauses 54 and 71 … Schedule 24 and … Schedule 26 are amended to remove that ability”.
I have tabled four amendments to do precisely that. In each case, they would take out the words “whenever passed”, meaning whenever passed in the future, and insert precisely the same words as those the Government themselves used in the drafting of Clause 88—that is, that they would amend or repeal provision made by an Act of Parliament
“passed before, or in the same Session as, this Act”.
I think there is a small, technical problem with my amendment in relation to Schedule 26. Since it relates to an insertion to the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, the reference to “this Act” might be inaccurate. However, we will not worry about that, because we can deal with it on Report as necessary.
The purpose of these four amendments relates to a number of places. It relates to Clause 54, which we are dealing with presently, which modifies the functions of mayors and strategic authorities; Clause 71, which concerns the licensing of taxis and private hire vehicles; Schedule 24, which we have just been discussing, which concerns licensing powers for the Mayor of London; and Schedule 26, which relates to local government reorganisation powers. The subject matter of those powers is almost unimportant; the point is that, in each case, the Government have used the same language to give themselves the power, by statutory instrument, to amend future Acts of Parliament beyond this Session. In the same way as Clause 88, each of my amendments would limit that power to amend Acts passed or made up to the end of this parliamentary Session.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, has tabled Amendment 184. As I say, I have tabled Amendment 184A, because it does the same thing as the others, whereas Amendment 184 would remove the regulation-making power entirely. I submit that that would go too far, since there is often a need to make consequential or incidental provision.
The essential point that I come back to is that there is no basis for justifying taking a power to amend future Acts of Parliament in future Sessions, because those Bills, when they are introduced to this place, can take account of, and make their own provision for, what the future shape of legislation should look like. It is not a question of saving parliamentary time; they can be dealt with in those Acts when the time comes. I beg to move.