Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)

Of course it is a difficult decision, but that is the decision the person has to be clear, firm and settled about. I do not see parity between the decision the individual has to make and making sure there are appropriately qualified people ensuring that the person has the disease. They seem to be two important but different requirements. The next group of amendments, primarily advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Frost, is on the question of whether suffering should be an element in the eligibility—that terminal illness itself is not sufficient. We have had this debate a number of times, particularly at Second Reading, on some the circumstances where a terminal illness should be excluded. For all the reasons I have given in the past, I am not in favour of suffering being the requirement. What suffering is will vary from person to person. In some cases, it will be the indignity. In some cases, it will be the appalling thought of the change in relationship with those they love. For others, it will be the pain they are going through. It is not, in my respectful view, an appropriate or easily applied condition. So, for all the reasons I have given on a number of occasions before, I am against putting in the question of suffering. The next group of amendments is that advanced this morning by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. They say that if you are the victim of medical negligence, you should not be entitled to an assisted death. If, for example, your doctor failed to diagnose your condition early enough for you to get treatment and, as a result, you are likely to die earlier, even though you have the condition—for example, prostate cancer—is the position that, because of the negligence of your doctor, you are truly to be denied the right to an assisted death? Unfortunately, I cannot see the logic of that.