Dr Ben Spencer

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the knowledge and experience he brings to the background of that particular case. I entirely agree that it is incumbent on all parties across the House to strengthen our national security and to be clear-eyed about the threat of hostile state actors. I will continue to develop that point in my wind-up speech. The evidence is clear that we face an increasing threat from foreign state actors. We need to take action to recognise those risks and to prevent such attacks. Cyber-security should be at the forefront of our defences, and for that reason, His Majesty’s loyal Opposition have focused again on amending the Bill, particularly with new clauses 14 and 15. We table them in the hope that the Government will not squander another opportunity to act in this Bill. New clause 14 would require the Government to directly identify the threats we face, ending the prevarication we have seen in recent months by obliging the Secretary of State to establish and maintain by regulation a list of foreign powers presenting a significant cyber-security risk to the UK. The amendment would strengthen the link between intelligence agencies and policy enforcement, ensuring that decisions by the Secretary of State to deploy special national security direction powers are based on GCHQ’s verified risk assessments regarding hostile states and state-affiliated groups. It is not about reacting after an attack occurs, but creating a proactive framework to evaluate and mitigate threats, built directly into UK supply chains. That would ensure that the UK is better prepared to deal with cyber-threats and attacks from hostile state actors. With the risks continuing to grow, these decisions cannot remain at the political whim of a Government who are reluctant to act. Let us talk about the dragon in the room. In 2024, the National Cyber Security Centre confirmed that China state-affiliated actors were responsible for cyber-attacks on the UK’s Electoral Commission and Parliament in 2021 and 2022, yet this Government continue to refuse to recognise China as a threat to the UK. New clause 14 would compel the Government to recognise formally what is readily apparent to those on these Benches, to our security services and to the many Members across both Houses who have expressed urgent concern about the security risks that China and other foreign state actors pose to the United Kingdom. The new clause would force the Government to acknowledge that China is a threat. In view of this established and growing threat, our new clause 15 would compel the Secretary of State to review state-sponsored cyber-threats to the UK’s infrastructure, including the cyber-security risk to surrounding critical networks in the vicinity of the super-embassy site in the City of London. As I said in Committee, there is simply no point in granting the Secretary of State powers to issue directions on the basis of national security if the Government are not willing to be clear-eyed about the most critical national and cyber-security threats to this nation. The new clause also strikes an important balance between ensuring parliamentary scrutiny and recognising and protecting the sensitive nature of some of the material that may be unearthed, by making provision for such information to be sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. I am pleased that, having resisted calls to address this risk during previous stages of the Bill’s progress, the Government have now taken some action to address risks from foreign state actors. The publication last week of their National Security (State Threats) Bill comes in response to a sharp spike in state-backed intelligence operations, sabotage and proxy violence. Their own explanatory notes to that Bill state: “Threats to the UK from foreign states are persistent and take many forms, including espionage, foreign interference in the UK’s political system, sabotage, disinformation, cyber operations, and even assassinations. Collectively these are referred to by the Government as state threats.” However, the Bill itself does not once mention cyber-security, and contains no provision requiring assessment of the risks posed. It does not apply to states themselves, and therefore can only be complemented and strengthened by new clauses 14 and 15, which no responsible Government or Member of the House could vote against. Amendment 3, which would insert a provision headed “Exemption from disclosure: right to a fair trial”, was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). As a Member of Parliament whose constituency includes Runnymede, I am proud both to call him a friend and to work with him on, in particular, his fight for the rule of law and fair trials. The amendment would prevent the sharing of information with overseas authorities for the purpose of prosecuting crimes not committed in the UK, if the Secretary of State determined that the receiving country was one in which the right to a fair trial could not be guaranteed. It would address genuine human rights concerns, and would close a loophole in the Bill that currently fails to anticipate politically motivated requests from authoritarian states. It would help to block hostile state actors such as Russia, China and Iran from probing our systems to detect firmware back doors or vulnerabilities within, for instance, the UK’s utility networks, healthcare systems and data centres. It would also create a statutory duty for the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Parliament justifying decisions on which foreign jurisdictions are trusted or barred from intelligence sharing. That alone would be invaluable, and would end the many fruitless hours of questions and debate in the Chamber initiated by Conservative Members seeking a clear answer from the Government on whether they see countries such as China as a threat—per my earlier remarks. I am therefore pleased, on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition, to support my right hon. Friend’s amendment. Let me also pay tribute to the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah). I thank her for her comments, which were echoed by others, about the risk from the internet of things and cellular modules. That is an important area, and we need to get it right. I will conclude by addressing the amendments tabled by our Liberal Democrat colleagues regarding digital sovereignty and the impact that this approach could have on the UK. New clause 13 is the clearest demonstration to date that the Liberal Democrats do not understand the tech sector or global supply chains. Of course it is right to support British business, but it is not feasible or possible to achieve full sovereignty in a global market or supply chain. Rather, we should prioritise capacities and capabilities, and ensure that the UK has an indispensable role in global supply chains.