Katie Lam

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Dowd. I congratulate the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) on securing this important debate. For far too many people and in far too many places, the high street has become a visible sign of where the British state has lost control. People suspect that the cash-only takeaways, barber’s shops and vape shops that they see springing up on their high streets are symptomatic of a deeper rot. As the hon. Gentleman and many others set out, in many cases they are right. All too often, such high street shops are linked to organised crime, including through the sale of illicit or counterfeit goods, money laundering, immigration crime and people smuggling. Last month, the BBC uncovered that people smugglers are directing migrants to pay for illegal channel crossings using a network of high street businesses, including mobile phone shops. In 2024 alone, trading standards seized more than 1 million illegal vapes and 19 million illegal cigarettes. As the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Harpreet Uppal) mentioned, the National Crime Agency estimates that £1 billion of crime-linked cash is laundered through high street businesses every year. It is clearly difficult to produce reliable estimates of things such as money laundering, so the real figure may be even higher. The money laundered by such businesses often fuels human trafficking or the drug trade. The problem is only getting worse. According to one survey, 99% of trading standards professionals have seen an increase in the number of cash-intensive businesses opening on their local high streets in recent years. Cash-intensive businesses often provide the best fronts for money laundering and the trade in illicit and counterfeit goods. While businesses that do the right thing are struggling with ever more regulation and ever higher taxes, businesses with links to organised crime are thriving. To combat the rise in illicit activity on our high streets, we must understand the criminal networks that sustain that activity and the link in many cases between those networks and immigration. Let us imagine, for example, an organised crime gang involved in the drugs trade. When that gang sells drugs to people, payment will most often be made in cash, because cash is harder to trace. However, if that business wants to bring its cash into the normal financial system, it will need to launder the money so as not to provoke suspicion. If a person suddenly deposits tens of thousands of pounds with no clear income source, a bank will register that as suspicious, but not so if the money is deposited by a high street business. The gang might therefore set up a high street shop—something cash-intensive and with low overhead costs, such as a vape shop. The shop records its transactions but adds to those real purchases a series of phantom cash sales used to disguise the illicit cash raised by the sale of drugs. The deposit appears legitimate and can be backed up with paperwork. Once that cash is deposited, it can be paid out as profit to those involved in running the organisation, for example as a fake invoice to an overseas supplier that is paid out to a shell company registered abroad. The criminal gangs involved in the drug trade operate across borders both financially and physically. They will have overseas suppliers who provide them with the drugs that they sell. These supply networks are often sustained by links between people of the same nationality, ethnicity or even extended family. Often, these drug gangs are also involved in other kinds of cross-border smuggling—of counterfeit goods, illegal tobacco and, indeed, people.