Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)

I thank noble Lords for their amendments, and I recognise the concerns that have been expressed. Technology is evolving at a rapid pace, and it is important that we harness the benefits and, equally, protect against the risks it may pose. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, asked about the approach that we take. We understand how quickly technology is evolving, and it is important that we have a flexible and future-proof approach. If we limit ourselves to specific technologies, we will not capture new developments. For instance, when the NIS regulations were introduced in 2018, we could not have predicted the role that AI and quantum would play in cyber. That is why the Bill takes an “all hazards, all threats, all technologies” approach. This requires regulated entities to manage all the risks relevant to their network and information systems. For example, if AI forms a part of the system that the essential service relies on—for example, in the provision of drinking water—that entity must assess and mitigate the risks it poses. More generally, the Government take the concerns very seriously. The UK is taking a leading role with our approach to AI security. I will set out my response to each amendment in turn, but while we do not consider the amendments proposed to be the right approach, I reassure noble Lords that the Government are exploring whether additional targeted interventions may be needed in future to address the most significant AI-related national security risks. As the Government’s thinking is at an early stage, I would be open to future engagement with noble Lords on potential options. Any future approach would need to have carefully designed measures, with the evidence base proportionate to and targeted at the risks in question, while minimising unintended impacts on growth, innovation and the operation of critical services. I turn to the amendments. The intention of the NIS regime is to require organisations to protect themselves from risks that could compromise their network and information systems, which could include a cyber attack, a natural disaster or even human error. That protection would be appropriate and proportionate to the risks faced by those organisations, including state-of-the-art technology such as AI. I reassure noble Lords that this would include relevant risks from AI embedded within the systems of regulated organisations. To take one example, healthcare providers in scope of the regime would be required to manage risks associated with the AI products they use to provide their services. This is because essential services in scope must look at, and work to mitigate, risks posed to their network and information systems. As AI is increasingly becoming embedded across the economy, we will keep its impact on the regulatory landscape under review. The Bill is focused on the cyber security and resilience of network and information systems; broader questions about the regulation of AI systems are more appropriately addressed through separate discussions, for example on online safety. Bringing providers of AI services—those companies at the cutting edge of frontier AI development—and their products into the scope of the NIS regime, which Amendment 6 seeks to do, would not address the harms that can be posed by some AI products and services. Specifically, it would not prevent their misuse by hostile actors. Instead, the Government are already taking firm action in more appropriate ways, which also speaks to the concerns that Amendment 75 would aim to address and which the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, asked about. First, the UK AI Security Institute, as noble Lords are well aware, is world leading in its research on advanced AI capabilities. AISI was set up to build a rigorous scientific understanding of the capabilities of the most advanced AI systems and the risks they pose. It works with developers to strengthen security before models are released and ground policy decisions in evidence rather than speculation, especially as they relate to national security matters. Secondly, the UK Government are taking a leading role in addressing these risks in both the domestic and international setting. As the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, and others have set out, including the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, it is critical that this approach has global impact. Our AI cyber security code of practice has formed the basis of the world’s first global standard, EN 304 223, which sets baseline security requirements for developers and deployers across the AI life cycle. This demonstrates our global leadership and commitment to shaping international technical standards, which go wider than some of the issues raised in this Bill. Underpinning all this is a simple but powerful message, which was set out in a joint Five Eyes statement in June. It recommended that as AI capabilities evolve all industry, including vendors, should seek to step up their cyber defences. This is a clear call to action for all organisations, including the Government, and a reminder that the key tenets of cyber hygiene still stand strong. That is also why we are committed to building a national-scale AI-enabled cyber defence for the UK, Cyber Shield. It will scan UK systems continuously to discover vulnerabilities and apply national-level mitigations. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, tabled Amendment 75, which sets out several red lines on AI capabilities that would enable an AI system to facilitate significant risks to the UK. The noble Baroness will recognise that AI is one of many technologies that can be used for beneficial and harmful purposes, as she has mentioned on previous occasions. In addition to the example of chemistry questions, banking services can be used to connect families but might also be used to finance illegal terrorist activities. Equally, while powerful AI capabilities can be used by malicious actors to cause harm to the UK, they might also be used by the national security community to defend the UK and by UK organisations and companies to protect themselves from harm. It is therefore not in the UK’s national interest to restrict UK organisations and the public sector accessing powerful AI capabilities, especially given the global nature of AI risks. It is also unlikely that AISI would be able to give conclusive assurances regarding AI models in the way envisaged in this amendment. Testing shows what a model can do, but not conclusively what it cannot, as the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, pointed out. The noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, tabled Amendment 12, which would require RDSPs to follow guidance issued by the AI Security Institute. For the reasons I set out on Amendment 6 and because it is not AISI’s role to provide guidance of this nature, I do not think it would be appropriate. I will set out more detail on AISI’s role later in my response. On Amendment 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, we have chosen to go further than our EU counterparts and the NIS2 regime to respond to these risks by bringing forward powers in the Bill to direct regulated entities if there is a national security risk in relation to their network and information system. This may be used, for instance, to require a regulated entity to cease using and isolate an AI model. We believe this is a more proportionate and effective response, as data centres operate in highly complex ecosystems and AI systems are often distributed across different data centres and jurisdictions. It is much less desirable to direct multiple data centres to shut down, with the impact this could have on services that rely on them, than to direct them to cease using an AI model. This is important, as our economic security will grow as UK companies grow as they increase AI adoption as we develop our domestic capabilities and attract global talent, underpinned by our data centre and digital infrastructure. I refer to my introductory remarks on exploring further targeted interventions. This includes examining whether proportionate containment powers could provide a more effective and targeted response, including powers to restrict access to specific AI systems where necessary to prevent or mitigate serious harm. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also seeks a regular report on AI security. In December 2025, the AI Security Institute published Frontier Al Trends Report, which sets out high-level trends on AI progress based on two years of government-led testing of leading models. Amendments 85, 86, 92 and 98, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Tarassenko and Lord Clement-Jones, are a testament to AISI’s leading role and expertise. They seek to provide AISI with powers to address potential risks arising from frontier AI models. I have already set out the important role that AISI plays building a rigorous scientific understanding of the capabilities of the most advanced AI systems and the risks they pose, working with developers to strengthen security before models are released and grounding policy decisions in evidence rather than speculation. These amendments would give AISI a role that it was not designed to fulfil. AISI’s focus on frontier technology and trusted relationships with the world’s leading AI labs allow it to keep pace with the fast-moving technology, thereby providing critical awareness of the most novel and serious AI risks. This amendment would undermine the voluntary collaboration on which AISI operates. A regulatory role for AISI is therefore the wrong answer, but the Government remain committed to ensuring that AISI is equipped to fulfil its vital role and will continue to keep the House updated on its work as appropriate. As I have just set out, such amendments raise a real risk of placing barriers on AI adoption and deployment in the UK. Due to the scope of the Bill, the amendments cannot address wider AI harms or cyber security in the wider economy. I share concerns about the potential of hostile actors using frontier AI models against our essential services. Placing these restrictions on their deployment in the UK, as amended, would not be effective. I shall respond to the direct question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on large language models. Large language models are not typically considered online search engines in respect of the CSRB. While some LLMs can be seen to share similar characteristics and may utilise online search engines, their functions tend to be much broader. I hope that I have addressed the points raised—well, I hope that I have at least touched on all the points raised today. On the points made on changes to the Government, I very well recall the numerous discussions that we have had on AI over the past few months and continue to be the point of continuity on them. As I have said, the Government will be happy to engage with noble Lords as options are being considered. We always stand ready to protect our national and economic security.