Baroness Goldie (Con)

My Lords, I wish to make it clear that I tabled the Clause 16 stand part notice not because I oppose the changes the Government are making but because I seek some clarifications on the intended effects and operation of the changes being made. I am particularly grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich for his engagement with my noble friend Lord Minto on this matter. He offered an insightful explanation of the effects of Clause 16 and the intention behind his amendments, which I will comment on in due course. I also recognise the pressure that has built since the Etherton review for greater independence in the handling of service justice matters, but Clause 16 makes a significant change to how pre-charge detention operates. As I understand it, Clause 16 amends Sections 98 and 99 of the 2006 Act so that the authorisation and review of custody without charge—currently a function of the commanding officer—is transferred to a newly defined “appropriate authority”. The commanding officer will no longer be the person to whom an arrest and its grounds must be reported, nor the person who orders release once the grounds for detention fall away. In cases involving serious offences, the Bill goes further, requiring matters to be reported beyond the commanding officer altogether. I press the Minister on what this means in practice. Custody decisions sit close to the heart of a commanding officer’s responsibility for the people under his or her command. A commanding officer who no longer authorises, or is even routinely informed of, the custody of a member of the unit loses a degree of visibility over discipline and welfare that has traditionally gone hand in hand with command. I am not arguing that visibility must always trump independence. There may be good reasons, particularly in sensitive cases, for distancing these decisions from the chain of command. But what happens in operations, for example, where a commanding officer’s swift decision-making may be necessary? What assessment has been made of the effect on unit cohesion and discipline where a commanding officer is no longer the first port of call? Service justice depends on decisions being made promptly by somebody with the standing and the proximity to make them properly. If the appropriate authority is going to be some distance removed from the unit, either in rank or in geography, the Government need to explain how that gap will be bridged without compromising either the rights of the individual in custody or the operational chain of command’s ability to function. I hope the Minister can set out clearly what triggered these changes and why they are necessary. Very importantly, what alternatives were considered? Equally importantly, what consultation took place with commanding officers themselves before this approach was settled upon? Having said that, I understand that there are instances where commanding officers have been too close to the matters in hand and have therefore not appropriately dealt with the accusations. The right reverend Prelate has argued that the provost marshal should have the ability to be an appropriate authority in all service offences, not only in cases where a serious offence has been committed. I have considerable sympathy with that view. If we are to make the change the Government propose—although I have some reservations, I do not oppose it outright—it is certainly sensible to extend the involvement of the provost marshal. I shall await with interest the Minister’s comments on the arguments advanced by the right reverend Prelate, and on the potentially enhanced role of the provost marshal.