Lord Coaker (Lab)

It was all going so well. I do not think there is a unanimity of view on this one. I start, however, by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for moving the amendment. I think we will probably end up debating this issue again; we may all be a little bit more excitable in the way that we deal with it. In answer to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, of course a breach of an order means someone can be recalled. That is like any court order; if it is breached, the court has the power, capability and capacity to bring people back and deal with it appropriately then. Amendment 37 would remove the presumption of suspended sentence orders from the service justice system. In doing so, it would reverse a reform that was introduced to align the service justice system’s sentencing practices with wider government sentencing policy while preserving the unique requirements of service discipline. The presumption forms part of the Government’s response to former Lord Chancellor David Gauke’s Independent Sentencing Review 2025, which recommended reducing the use of short custodial sentences and increasing the availability of suspended sentence orders. The policy was based on evidence that short custodial sentences are often less effective at reducing reoffending than community-based interventions. It therefore sought to encourage rehabilitative disposals that better support longer-term public protection. The reform—this is the crucial point—does not remove the ability of service courts to impose immediate custody. Courts retain the discretion to do so where there are exceptional circumstances or where immediate custody is necessary to maintain service discipline. I think that is the fundamental point: in the end, the court makes the judgment as to whether it should apply immediate custody or allow a suspended sentence. Suspended sentence orders remain an effective sanction, carrying punitive and rehabilitative requirements and the prospect that the custodial sentence will be activated, which is the point I have just made to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, if the offender fails to comply. It is the Government’s long-standing policy that the service justice system should emulate the civilian criminal justice system unless there are compelling service-specific reasons to deviate from it. The Government are not persuaded, and neither am I personally, that such a case has been made here. Furthermore, removing the presumption in the service justice system alone could lead to different sentencing outcomes for similar offenders across the civilian and service jurisdictions. It could also complicate decisions about the appropriate jurisdiction where there is no service interest justifying divergence. For these reasons, the Government consider that the current approach strikes the right balance between rehabilitation, judicial discretion, service discipline and consistency across the justice system. I therefore invite the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, to withdraw this amendment, although my suspicion is that we may return to this particular debate and discussion. As I say, we might do it at a more excitable time when we can all explore what is a fundamental point within our society that needs to be aired.