Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the purpose and effect of these two instruments. Although both are technically dense, they share a common and quite straightforward purpose: they replace parts of the inherited or temporary post-EU framework with permanent UK arrangements. It gives us an opportunity to make the regime more proportionate and better suited to the UK market while preserving the prudential safeguards on which financial stability depends. We support both instruments in principle, but I have a few important, mainly technical, questions. I hope that the Minister will be able to answer them today; if not, perhaps he could write to the Committee by way of follow-up. I turn first to the overseas prudential requirements regime regulations. The instrument carries across a substantial number of existing recognitions from the outset, for countries with sophisticated regulatory regimes, such as the US and Singapore, to some with newer and riskier ones. That is welcome because it should prevent a cliff edge for firms when the EU-derived framework is revoked. The separate treatment afforded to Gibraltar also reflects the particularly close relationship between our two financial systems. It is important to be clear that designation does not make an exposure risk free, automatically give it a zero-risk weight or amount to a blanket finding that every aspect of an overseas regime is equivalent to our own. The Treasury can designate a jurisdiction for particular institutions or exposures and may attach conditions. The detailed prudential treatment will continue to depend on the PRA rulebook and the characteristics of the exposure concerned. This, of course, places considerable responsibility on the Treasury when deciding which jurisdictions should be recognised and for what purpose. What evidence and methodology will the Treasury use when assessing an overseas regime? What formal role will the regulators play in this determination, and will the Treasury publish its assessment when making a new designation, so that Parliament and the market can understand the basis for the decision? There is also the question of what happens after a designation has been made. Prudential standards, supervisory capacity and political circumstances can change. How will the Treasury monitor designated jurisdictions on an ongoing basis, and how frequently will their status be reviewed? If standards deteriorate, can a designation be suspended or withdrawn urgently during a period of financial stress, and how quickly could that decision take effect? Future designation decisions will ordinarily be made under the negative procedure. Given that those decisions can affect the capital treatment of significant overseas exposures, will the Minister explain why that level of parliamentary scrutiny is considered sufficient? Will the Government at least commit to placing a clear assessment of the prudential case and the expected effect of each designation before Parliament? Finally, on this instrument, Regulation 5 establishes a mechanism for recognising overseas eligible covered bonds, but the initial Schedule does not appear to designate any jurisdiction for that purpose. Can the Minister explain when the Treasury expects the power to be used? I turn to the Over the Counter Derivatives (Intragroup Transactions) Regulations. These provide a permanent replacement for temporary post-Brexit arrangements, governing exemptions from the clearing and margin requirements in UK EMIR. This is targeted deregulation rather than the dismantling of the wider derivatives regime. It does not exempt ordinary transactions with unrelated third parties, and the FCA retains an important supervisory role. The hope is that the reforms will reduce duplication, release collateral and make it easier for international groups to manage risk centrally. In considering this instrument, it would be helpful to know how things stand on derivative policy more generally. In particular, are the French still seeking to transfer valuable trade through protective EU regulation or have they seen sense, given the interests of their own companies and banks? The Treasury says that no significant impact is expected. That is rather disappointing for a deregulatory measure, and it has consequently not produced a full impact assessment. What estimate has it made of the clearing, collateral and administrative costs that firms will avoid and the scale of any hidden costs? How, in practical terms, will the new notification system reduce the time and compliance work involved, compared with the present arrangements? Has Dr Felix Martin of the Cost Benefit Analysis Panel been given a chance to take a view? These are both serious measures, which is why they are subject to affirmative resolution, and I would like some reassurance on the deregulatory impact. The Government present these reforms as supporting the competitiveness of the UK financial services sector, which is obviously an objective that we support. How does our new framework compare with the treatment of intragroup derivatives in the European Union, the United States or other major financial centres? Will the United Kingdom become a more attractive location for the treasury and risk management operations of international groups? If so, what indicators will the Treasury use to assess whether that benefit is realised? The FCA’s role will be central. Is the Minister satisfied that it will have the information, expertise and capacity needed to assess potentially complex international group structures within the 30-day period? Where an exemption concerns two overseas entities, how will supervisory responsibility be co-ordinated with the relevant overseas authorities? Conditions can also change, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained. A jurisdiction may introduce capital controls, a local regulator may impose ring-fencing requirements or funds that once moved freely may become trapped during a crisis. What continuing obligation will firms have to notify the FCA of such changes? What power will the FCA have to suspend or withdraw an exemption? The central task in both cases is to ensure that greater flexibility and competitiveness are accompanied by robust supervision, continuing vigilance and appropriate parliamentary transparency. However, I am clear that these are important instruments and, subject to some sensible answers on these questions, we support them.