Rebecca Smith

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I welcome this debate. As we know, the petition asks for parental orders to be permitted at birth. I believe that Members should approach the proposal with extreme caution. The number of people who have signed the petition—over 113,000, including 226 of my own constituents—is clearly testament to the strength of feeling on the issues. However, the petitioners frame the parental order process as an obstacle to parental rights, but that is fundamentally misleading. The legal process provides important protections for surrogate women and the children they carry. Currently, intended parents can apply for parental orders only after six weeks from the birth, and they must usually do so within six months. That cooling-off period provides a vital safeguard for the surrogate mother, and we should not dispense with it lightly. I believe we need to take a step back and remember why this House has historically approached surrogacy with so much caution. It is now undeniable that we have moved well beyond the purposes originally used to justify IVF and assisted reproductive technologies. IVF was initially intended to help a childless couple have a child, not to create a contractual market out of pregnancy. That sense of mission creep is also evident when we look at the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. The Warnock committee, whose report led to the Act, did not regard surrogacy as simply another form of fertility treatment. Now, over 40 years later, surrogacy has become just another service routinely offered at clinics across the country. Technology allows us to separate genetic parenthood, gestational motherhood and social parenthood. However, it does not mean those relationships are interchangeable. Technology may give us choices, but it does not absolve us from making ethical judgments about those choices. It is worth noting that the UK is an outlier in allowing any form of surrogacy at all. Surrogacy is much more strictly limited, or even completely prohibited, in countries including France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. We know that some of those countries are particularly liberal in other areas, so the fact that they are strong on this gives us reason to question why they take that position. That reflects the serious ethical questions that arise when a child is intentionally separated from the woman who carried them in the womb. Commercial surrogacy is illegal across the EU, where it is classed as a form of child trafficking. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on violence against women and girls has recommended the global abolition of surrogacy. Last year she described surrogacy as characterised by the exploitation of women and children, including girls. In any future reforms of surrogacy legislation, the welfare and safety of women and children should remain our paramount concern. I acknowledge that the desire of many people who turn to surrogacy is for a child, and that that is a profound need within them. I think that is something on which we are all able to agree. Some women face infertility or repeated pregnancy loss, and some face medical conditions that make it impossible or even unsafe for them to carry a pregnancy themselves. For some people, surrogacy may seem to be the only path to having a child with a genetic connection to them. I do not question the deep desire for that, nor do I underestimate the pain that can come from wanting a child and being unable to have one. That said, compassion for those experiences cannot require us to overlook the women and children affected by surrogacy. By its very nature, surrogacy involves a woman’s body becoming a means to an end. She is carrying a child for the benefit of another family. My concern is that our efforts to help people to become parents risk constructing a system in which women’s reproductive capacity becomes merely a resource for others to use. One of my main concerns with the petition is that it implies that surrogacy is closer to natural conception than to adoption; I believe that is again misguided. With adoption we do not pretend that the birth mother is irrelevant simply because she will not raise the child herself. That woman has already nurtured the child in her womb for nine months and the law rightly recognises that her role matters: the original birth record remains in existence and the adopted child can access it later in life, as an adult, if they wish. Similarly, a surrogate may not intend to raise the child she carries, but that does not mean that her role should be legally obliterated at birth. We should also consider the needs of the child. A baby bonds with their mother in utero regardless of whether the surrogate uses her own egg in the pregnancy. The child’s birth mother is an important person in the child’s story and the law should therefore recognise the birth mother’s indispensable contribution in bringing new life into the world. I also have concerns about financial incentives. In this country a surrogate mother cannot simply be paid a fee for producing a baby. She may receive reasonable expenses, including for things such as maternity clothing, travel and loss of earnings, but typical reimbursements now reach as much as £25,000. I think we would all agree that that is quite a substantial sum, which should give us pause for thought. There is an important distinction between reimbursement and income. It is one thing if a woman is compensated for genuine expenses, but if pregnancy becomes a source of substantial financial benefit, we need to ask whether we are still talking about altruism or whether we are creating a market in all but name. Pregnancy is not risk-free; it can involve serious medical complications. However, uncertainty about whether a payment is reimbursement of an expense or a fee clouds the situation. We cannot discuss this issue without considering the wider international picture. Most parental orders for UK parents now involve commercial surrogacy abroad; we have heard a lot about that already. It should concern us all that international surrogacy takes place in jurisdictions where the economic circumstances of surrogate mothers are very different from those in Britain. If wealthy countries normalise the commissioning of pregnancies, there will inevitably be markets that meet that demand. In most cases, the women with the least economic power become the people expected to take the greatest physical risks. I will finish by reiterating that I have enormous sympathy for people who want children and cannot have them naturally. Their longing is real, but true compassion must extend to everyone involved, including to the women whose bodies bear the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth and to the children they bear. Do the Government remain committed to the parental order process and the safeguards that it provides? Those safeguards are not outdated as the petition suggests; indeed, they are needed now more than ever, especially as international surrogacy arrangements are becoming the norm for intended parents in the UK. The parental order process exists to ensure that a child’s welfare comes first and that a surrogate mother’s consent is freely given. Any reform should strengthen those protections for women and children, not diminish them.