Lord Clement-Jones (LD)

My Lords, I think that we are in the final furlong. In moving my Amendment 92C, I will also speak to the closely aligned Amendment 95C under my name. These amendments raise a profound and non-negotiable constitutional principle. They respond directly to the almost always authoritative recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its seventh report of this Session and are strongly supported by the principles laid down by the Select Committee on the Constitution in its third report. Together, these amendments seek to delete two deeply objectionable provisions that represent a classic example of secondary legislation creep—provisions where the Executive are seeking a blank cheque to unilaterally rewrite the rules. Amendment 92C targets Clause 37 and seeks to leave out subsection (7). Under the Bill as drafted, Clause 37(7) grants the Secretary of State the unilateral power to make regulations to amend the Act to change and potentially dilute the consultation and parliamentary scrutiny requirements that apply to a code of practice. This is a Henry VIII power of quite an extensive kind. In the Government’s original delegated powers memorandum of November 2025, the department, as it then was, argued that this power was necessary to allow flexibility in case a 40-day parliamentary scrutiny period became, in its words, “unfeasible” or “a detriment to the quality of … a code”. But as the Delegated Powers Committee correctly noted in its seventh report, the rules governing how Parliament scrutinises the Executive must be set by Parliament in primary legislation; they should not be subject to the administrative convenience of a Minister. Allowing a Minister to use secondary legislation to alter or weaken the very procedural safeguards that this House has debated is not constitutionally correct. The committee’s recommendation is clear and unambiguous: subsection (7) must be removed. That brings me to Amendment 95C, which seeks to leave out Clause 40(5). Clause 40 requires the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the operation of this cyber security legislation. However, subsection (5) grants the Secretary of State the power to amend this primary legislation via regulations to change the matters to be covered in those same reports. Again, in their original November 2025 memorandum, the Government defended this by claiming that they needed flexibility to ensure that reports could be expanded over time as technology matures. With the greatest respect, that argument is entirely spurious. If the Government merely wish to report on more things, they are already fully entitled to include voluntary supplementary chapters in their reports. But by granting themselves a statutory power to amend the legal requirements of Clause 40, they are taking the power to delete or dilute the core mandatory reporting obligations that Parliament has put in the Bill. They would, in effect, be legally empowered to write their own report cards, deciding behind closed doors what they must disclose to Parliament and what they can quietly omit, including critical scrutiny over how they have used the vast delegated powers under Clause 29(1). The Delegated Powers Committee was again clear. This power is inappropriate, lacks coherent justification and should be deleted from the Bill. The Select Committee on the Constitution too, in its third report, expressed serious anxieties about the overall design of the legislation. It warned that this is a framework Bill that relies far too heavily on secondary regulations to establish the actual perimeters of national cyber resilience. When a Bill already delegates such sweeping unprecedented powers to the Executive, amplified by the amendments to introduce a parallel high-risk vendor framework, laid on 24 August and discussed on the first day of this Committee, it is doubly important that the statutory channels of parliamentary oversight remain supreme. We cannot allow the Government to use secondary regulations to dismantle the guardrails that keep them accountable. I urge the Minister to accept these common-sense, committee-backed corrections and agree to delete Clause 37(7) and Clause 40(5) before Report. I beg to move.