Lord Coaker (Lab)

My Lords, I thank noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for introducing her amendments, and acknowledge the points she has made. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for his contribution to the debate. I say to him that clearly—not only in the context of this Bill but also within a whole range of other Bills, debates and topics—many of the cases that he mentions will be raised. There will be a more extensive debate on a whole range of those issues, and we need them to be discussed. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about the Council of Europe, the debate about the ECHR goes on continuously. Whether anyone has raised the specifics of this amendment with it, I am simply unaware. The ECHR provides for legally enforceable rights within the jurisdiction of the state. In some circumstances, that jurisdiction can extend beyond the territory of the state—namely, extraterritorial jurisdiction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction does not apply uniformly in relation to the various ECHR obligations, and the position has evolved over time through the case law of the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. I understand the concerns about how extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ECHR has been interpreted, but I want to make this very important point, which gets to the heart of why this amendment should not be made. Amending the Human Rights Act directly does not change the UK’s international law obligations under the ECHR, to which this Government wish to adhere. For instance, new Section 7A seeks to restrict the territorial extent of the Human Rights Act in relation to overseas operations. However, Article 13 of the ECHR requires the UK to provide an effective domestic remedy for anyone with an arguable claim that their convention rights have been violated. In other words, if the extraterritorial application of the Human Rights Act is removed, the UK will still need to ensure that there is a domestic remedy in respect of arguable ECHR breaches occurring in an overseas operation. Additionally, the existence of a domestic remedy separate from that provided for by the Human Rights Act would not prevent the European Court of Human Rights hearing a case where an applicant had exhausted that domestic remedy.