Baroness Coffey (Con)

My Lords, noble Lords may want to consider Amendment 180A an amuse-bouche before we get back into the real meat and honey, as it were. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for having also signed this amendment. We have already made it clear that the Pensions Act 2008 set out the requirements for auto-enrolment into pension schemes, which was commenced and brought into effect in 2012. As such, all employers are now required to provide a workplace pension scheme and to make contributions. The question I pose in this amendment is not whether pensions should be well regulated—that is a given—but whether the current regulatory architecture best supports effective supervision, good member outcomes and long-term system stability in this emerging ecosystem of pensions. I contend that it would do so only if occupational pensions, though not self-invested pensions, were regulated solely by the Pensions Regulator without the overlapping or parallel oversight of the Financial Conduct Authority. This is fundamentally an issue of regulatory design. The Pensions Regulator was established with a clear statutory mandate: to protect members’ benefits; to reduce the risk of calls on the Pension Protection Fund; and to promote the good administration of work-based pension schemes. Its regulatory approach is deliberately scheme-centric, focusing on governance, funding, the employer covenant, trustee capability and long-term risk management. By contrast, the Financial Conduct Authority’s framework is product and transaction centric. It is designed around the regulation of firms that either make, distribute or advise on financial products, with a particular emphasis on conduct at the point of sale, disclosure and consumer choice. The FCA’s tools, culture and regulatory philosophy—whether that is speed, competition, disclosure or transactional fairness—are shaped, in effect, by retail finance. That approach is fine, but I suggest to the Committee that it is not so well suited to not only the current pensions world but the evolving world of pensions that this Bill, in particular, is accelerating. Let us be clear: the FCA’s consumer duty is to the individual. That is not what we see with workplace pensions more broadly, where we have the trust-based approach. The ongoing involvement of the FCA in pensions risks creating, if it has not done so already, regulatory overlap without regulatory coherence. I am aware that there are statements of co-operation but, particularly with the evolution of the pensions world for employees through the Bill, this should lead us to consider a change in the regulatory approach. The contract-based approach is evolving and, as we have already debated, will now be able to be overridden. For that reason, I come back to the question of whether we should think about the Pensions Regulator being the sole regulator, apart from for self-invested personal pensions; I can see that the consumer duty element under those individual schemes is well suited to the FCA. The danger of dual regulation is real, costly and can be confusing. The uncertainty is evident. In having two different ways, there are some conflicts over how certain assets or schemes can be treated. There is the risk of misclassifying pensions as short-term financial products, rather than what could be really long-term social contracts. We know that people often remain disengaged from their pensions. Their outcomes therefore depend far more on scheme design, trustee competence and the long-term investment strategy. I think that the Pensions Regulator understands this reality much better. It recognises that good outcomes come from strong governance, clear fiduciary duties and long-term risk management in not only defined benefit schemes but defined contribution schemes. As I have already mentioned, I am conscious that, although there is collaboration, the risk of regulatory drift is still real. This would be solved by moving, in essence, to having one regulator for all occupational pension schemes. The Pensions Regulator has already shown that it can evolve. It has strengthened its focus on value for money, professional trustee standards, consolidation and other elements on which it is doing well. A single regulator would deliver clarity, coherence and confidence, which is why I have tabled this amendment seeking a review. More specifically, in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause, I suggest “a review to assess the viability”. I say “viability” deliberately but then, in subsection (2), I offer a little leeway on that review, including whether the Pensions Regulator should take it on. This may feel to many like dancing on the head of the pin but, actually, we are seeing these two regimes in parallel. In effect, we are starting to see almost the removal of the contract-based approach. As a consequence, we should grab the challenge and make this change. I am conscious that the Minister may ask, “Why did you not do this when you were in power?”, which is a fair question. But as my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott will know from the time we were doing the 2021 pension scheme, when we were bringing in certain measures, including dashboards, once the Treasury gets hold of something it does not want to let go. Let us not pretend otherwise. We are coming on to a debate shortly about superfunds. I am not going to reveal every battle that we had then; nevertheless, it was certainly a challenge. That is no disrespect to my other noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, because she was a great Treasury Minister. But it is a case of making sure that this Bill, in particular, is accelerating what is happening. It is going back, in effect, almost to a paternalistic or maternalistic approach, so it makes sense to at least review this change now. I hope the Minister will give it careful consideration. I beg to move.