Lord Moylan (Con)

I beg the Committee’s pardon: I got slightly muddled because of changes to the groupings. I come to my Amendments 60, 64A, 83, 84, 87, 94, 124, 125 and 291. The central issue running through these amendments is accountability. We are creating an enormous, new, publicly owned organisation that will, in all likelihood, receive billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money and exercise extraordinary control over the railway. It therefore needs clear objectives, measurable performance indicators and consequences for when it fails to deliver. Amendment 60 addresses the funding objectives. As drafted, the Bill says that the Secretary of State “may include” the specified objectives. My amendment would change that to “must include”. Amendment 64A would require consultation with railway service providers and the rail supply chain when those funding objectives are prepared. GBR will continue to rely enormously on the private rail supply chain. These businesses invest in skills, equipment and capacity on the basis of decisions taken by the Government and GBR, so it is sensible that those decisions are informed by their expertise and knowledge, as well as the consequences for employment and profits in the private sector that would arise from those decisions being made. They should be consulted. The remainder of my amendments address what might be called the problem of the missing key performance indicators. We have repeatedly been told that GBR will be held to robust performance measures, but what does “robust” actually mean? Amendment 124 would answer that question by establishing a proper, statutory KPI framework covering the things that passengers and taxpayers actually care about: reliability, safety, passenger experience, affordability and value for money, passenger growth, financial sustainability, productivity and efficiency, and freight performance. Of course, one can argue about what should be on the list; I would be willing to enter into discussions with the Minister about putting in something else or maybe adjusting something that I have proposed. However, we need to know what performance indicators are in the Bill—otherwise, we will be allowing GBR far too much unconstrained power and latitude, with little accountability. Amendment 94 would ensure that the long-term rail strategy is geared towards enabling GBR to meet these KPIs. The Government may say that a long-term rail strategy should not be dictated by short-term measures, but we have to get from the short term to the long term. A 30-year aspiration is of little value if there is no way of measuring whether GBR is moving towards it year by year. Amendment 125 would, therefore, require annual reporting and quarterly updates against those KPIs. Even I admit that quarterly updates might be a little onerous so, if the Minister objects, I will meet him half way and say, “Let’s have semi-annual updates”—I am a reasonable person and am open to suggestions—but something is needed if we are going to succeed. It is no good saying, as we did the other day, that the target is to achieve 75% growth in freight by 2050. Only the day before yesterday, the Government produced a statement saying that they have set an interim target. So they appreciate what I am saying, which is that there should be interim targets. However, the interim target is that freight should achieve 40% growth by 2040. None of us will be here. Nobody is asking, “What is the 2030 target?” There is no 2030 target; there is merely a 2040 target. That is not good enough. It is playing with achieving targets and would be simply laughable in the private sector. We need these targets; as I say, quarterly updates may be too onerous, but an update every decade or 15 years is just not good enough. Amendment 291 would give the ORR the important, independent job of assessing whether GBR is actually achieving its targets. Surely GBR cannot be allowed to mark its own homework. Amendment 84 would apply the same principle during the transition. This is a generational restructuring of the railways, involving employees, operators, freight, open access, local authorities, the supply chain and millions of passengers. A quarterly ministerial Statement—or even one once every six months—on progress towards GBR becoming fully operational would increase transparency, maintain focus and, importantly, prevent drift. Lastly, Amendment 87 concerns consequences. When I have asked the Minister privately how the Secretary of State will exercise control over GBR, he has said—he said this in a meeting for all Peers the other day, so I think I can repeat it—“Of course, she can always sack the chairman”. I suppose she can, because she is the sole shareholder in the business, but there was nothing about sacking the chief executive. Of course, it is not the Secretary of State’s job, as I understand it—we are not vouchsafed of these arrangements—to appoint or sack the chief executive; that would be a decision for the board. I am trying to introduce some accountability for the chief executive. We are giving the Secretary of State the power—not a duty, obviously—to dismiss the executive head of GBR when the organisation is failing against the KPIs and has also failed to act on guidance issued by the Secretary of State. It is not enough just to sack the chairman. You will not get anybody of any quality applying for the job if they are the only person whose head can roll; the chief executive needs to have their neck on the block as well. My noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 59 is obviously sound. The Secretary of State may “include objectives as to the standards to be achieved in relation to railway services”, but that “may” ought to be a “must”. My noble friend Lord Grayling’s Amendment 66, to which I have added my name, would require GBR’s business plan to contain measurable performance indicators for its statutory duties. This is simply basic accountability. If Parliament gives GBR duties, its business plan should explain how its performance against them will actually be measured.