Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)

My Lords, I am delighted, as chair of the International Agreements Committee, to lead this debate on the committee’s report on the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, better known as the Macolin convention. People in the UK are passionate about sport and the integrity of sport competitions is fundamental to their appeal. Match fixing and other forms of competition manipulation present real risks to the integrity of sport as well as to the UK’s sports betting sector. The Macolin convention is the first international treaty focused specifically on tackling this important issue, which increasingly transcends international borders. It was signed by the UK back in 2018 but was laid for ratification and scrutiny by Parliament only in June of this year. We judged the convention to be politically and legally significant and, as a result, we decided to report it to the House. Noble Lords will be aware that the usual scrutiny period for international agreements under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act is an extremely short 21 sitting days, which does not normally allow the committee time to take evidence on treaties. We therefore requested an extension of the scrutiny period to allow us to take evidence, which, I am delighted to say, the Government granted. We are grateful to them for this, as the extra time was vital to our ability to scrutinise the treaty properly. I am also grateful to the witnesses who gave up their time to give evidence to the committee, including senior officials from DCMS, and as always I thank our staff team, led by Dom Walsh, and particularly Ben Awkal and Paul Berman, for their excellent work in producing the report. I declare at the outset my interest as a non-executive director at Block Scholes Ltd, a technology company promoting some technologies that are used by Polymarket and prediction market companies. Competition manipulation in sport can take many forms. It can involve match fixing, which aims to fix the outcome of a sporting event, but it also includes fixing in-game events, often referred to as microfixes or spot fixing, as seen with recent high-profile incidents relating to deliberate yellow cards in football. We heard mixed evidence as to whether competition manipulation in the UK is getting worse overall or whether it is simply that the nature of the threat is changing. Three things were clear, however: this is an increasingly global and transnational problem; it is increasingly fuelled by organised criminal gangs who use the profits to launder the proceeds of other crimes, including drug and human trafficking; and certain sports and levels of sport are particularly vulnerable. Football and tennis appear to be the biggest targets, due to their popularity, while lower tiers of sports are vulnerable due to limited resources and easier-to-target participants. The consequences of competition manipulation are very serious. The sports and sports betting sector makes a significant contribution to the UK economy. In 2021, it contributed almost £100 billion of direct economic output, equivalent to 2.5% of total economic output for the year and around 1.25 million jobs. The Gambling Commission told us that if competition manipulation puts the integrity of sport in serious doubt, that could have an extensive commercial impact. There is also a profound cultural dimension, given the popularity of sport. The committee heard powerful testimony from Moses Swaibu, whom I thank for his contribution. He is a former professional footballer who was convicted for involvement in a 2013 match-fixing scandal and is now one of the leading advocates for combating match-fixing and educating young players about integrity. He told us, quite rightly, that a breach of sports integrity does not affect just football; it affects the entire country and its reputation. To address these issues, the Macolin convention sets out a range of measures aimed at preventing, detecting and sanctioning the manipulation of sports competitions and promoting national and international co-operation between public authorities, sports and sports betting organisations. We heard repeatedly that, although it has not yet formally ratified the convention, the UK is largely compliant with it and has been voluntarily implementing many of its provisions. We were therefore keen to understand what value was added by ratification. We concluded that the convention’s framework is both comprehensive and flexible. Its principal strengths are its provisions on international co-operation and information sharing. In the UK’s case, moving from voluntary compliance to ratification is expected to formalise, safeguard and enhance existing international co-operation, particularly information sharing, which is, in turn, expected to improve informing. It would also provide the UK with representation on the convention follow-up committee, enabling it to influence future Council of Europe decisions on the convention. Ratification seems to come with few disadvantages, as the costs are minimal. However, it comes with limitations. Nobody expects this convention to eliminate competition manipulation or unregulated betting entirely. It should be seen as one part of wider efforts rather than a complete solution. Although it is open to non-European states, it is at present predominantly European in its reach. This inevitably limits its ability to tackle what is clearly a global problem. Given that the UK has already been applying many of the convention’s provisions, implementation is not expected to be a major concern. We heard about a specific issue with Northern Ireland, which has different gambling legislation from the rest of the UK that is widely accepted to require reform, but government officials were confident that this would not prevent Northern Ireland’s compliance with the convention. I would be grateful for any further reassurance that the Minister can provide in this regard. I also want to raise a couple of scrutiny issues. First, the Government intend to enter a reservation in respect of the convention’s jurisdictional requirements. This was set out in the Explanatory Memorandum, but the reasons were not explained. The Government provided a further explanation after we wrote to them, but we ask that, in future, any reservations that the Government enter into in any international agreement are explained at the outset in the EM. I would be grateful if the Minister could take note of that. Secondly, on amendments to the convention, the EM simply stated that “Any amendment requiring ratification would be subject to” parliamentary scrutiny under CRaG. Statements such as these, which have been made by the Government in other EMs, are of no real use to the committee because they are circular. By definition, any amendment requiring ratification will be subject to scrutiny under CRaG. The real question for Parliament is whether amendments require ratification in the first place. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us useful input there. Again, the Government clarified this point in response to our written questions, but we should not have had to ask. We have repeatedly stressed that the Government should say in the EM which amendments will be subject to ratification and therefore scrutiny, and we have made that point again in our report. I would be grateful if the Minister could commit to that approach going forward. Overall, this is a useful agreement that helps to tackle an important issue. Match fixing is an international problem, and international co-operation is clearly part of the solution. It will not solve everything. Enforcement and preventive measures, such as education, remain vital, too, but it is clearly a step in the right direction. I beg to move.