Dr Zubir Ahmed

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for mentioning the Scottish context. We voted down such legislation on Third Reading, when we understood the impacts and the wider societal ramifications. I have to be honest. When I am asked to prognosticate on whether someone has six months to live, I am as often wrong as I am right. It is no longer a good enough marker for the DWP to use in discharging benefits for life-limiting conditions, and I do not see why it should be a good enough marker for prescribing death. There is another paradox in this legislation: someone like me could write a prescription to induce death with less regulatory oversight than is on me when I have to remove a kidney to give life through transplantation. Of course, I sympathise with and endorse the desire of many colleagues who support this Bill to relieve suffering. To be clear, we have many tools to do this, and we must bust some myths today. Clinical discretion, for instance, means that there is no maximum dose of morphine, so I can give my patients whatever they need, in the setting in which they need it. But this Bill is less about relieving suffering and more about bypassing its possibility, and I understand that. The Bill is in many ways advocating for death as prophylaxis. Under the definition in this Bill, death must be induced by medical prescription. It will be the only medical prescription that I will be able to write as a doctor but not administer, because the burden of administration falls to the patient, and the weight of expectation falls on the patient. We must discuss the mechanisms by which death will occur: muscle paralysis, slowing of the heart rate, sedation, and the possibility that paralysis will take hold before sedation does. Death will not be an event; it will still be a process. In 15% of cases, it will be subject to some form of complication, such as vomiting or seizures, and it will not always achieve its goal. I wish I could give hon. Members more information about the complication profile, but despite this procedure being prevalent in other jurisdictions across the world, the data continues to be woefully lacking. Alongside that, the 14-day cooling off period means that the patient must remain lucid in that time. There have been cases elsewhere in the world where patients have denied themselves palliative care and pain relief to remain lucid in order to consent to their death. I am therefore of the opinion that the foundational elements of this Bill will create the allure of choice and control, but not the agency to pursue either. Turning to safeguards, much is made of the provision requiring two doctors to assess eligibility, but the trouble is that neither has to know the patient well, or go to any great lengths to exclude the likelihood of coercion. Doctors are trained to do many things, but assessing and picking up on coercion is not one of them. In fact, consultant psychiatrists with PhDs in coercion, like the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), whom I hope we will hear from soon, have said in written testimony presented in court that they would find it difficult to exclude coercive controlling behaviour. I came into medicine, and into Parliament, to act with compassion, and to provide dignity to those we serve. I believe that is why we are all here. Compassion and kindness is not the preserve of one those on one side of the argument or another, but for me, compassion and kindness also calls to courage—the courage to be honest with patient and constituent alike. We need the compassion and honesty to say that the Bill will not fulfil its aims; it will disappoint many who crave total agency and control, and it will expose and disenfranchise further the vulnerable in our society. We need the compassion and honesty to say that our NHS, while a great institution, is not, in its current form and state, ready. It is not safe for this conversation or for this Bill in this moment.