Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for explaining that to me. I would like to hear that corroborated by the Minister, if he would. This one obviously needs safeguards and so on. My Amendment 331 is quite specific, but it raises two important questions about what we consider to be competitive parts of the railway. The first is rolling stock. We discussed on the first day the question of bringing rolling stock into public ownership. The Office for National Statistics is also considering the accounting treatment of rolling stock companies, including whether their leases should ultimately appear on the public sector balance sheet. I do not want to rehearse that whole debate here, but it is worth asking whether treating rolling stock as a competitive market should simply be taken for granted. If the Government’s ambition is to create a genuinely integrated railway, which I hope it is, there may be circumstances where intervention in the rolling stock market is necessary. Removing rolling stock from this particular competition provision would at least allow that policy question to be considered without assuming that competition must always be the organising principle. The second issue is passenger information systems. I would like the Minister to explain exactly what is meant by these systems in this legislation—if not, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, could help me out. This provision dates back to the Railways Act 1993, when the technology and structure of the railway were very different. If we are talking about the digital systems that allow information to be shared across the rail network, there is a strong argument for treating them as essential railway infrastructure. That would not necessarily prevent competition in ticket retailing or other services, but the underlying information infrastructure needs to work across the network. Can the Minister therefore clarify what systems are covered by this provision and why they need to be treated as a competitive market? My Amendment 332 raises a broader question about the position of competition regulation within the new railway. As I understand it, the effect of this provision is that the ORR’s competition functions under Section 67 of the Railways Act 1993 will continue to apply to Chapter 2 of Part 1 of this Bill. However, the Bill also establishes a rail strategy and a set of general duties for Great British Railways, so I want to understand how these things fit together. If the ORR is applying competition regulation to the new strategy framework, could that regulation prevent GBR implementing something that is otherwise consistent with the rail strategy and its general duties, and, if so, which takes priority? We have heard arguments that the ORR’s role is being reduced under this Bill, but this provision seems to leave it with significant powers in relation to competition. I would like us to be clear about where the balance lies. Are we creating a new railway strategy, which GBR is expected to deliver, while simultaneously giving the regulator the ability to intervene where it considers competition requirements have not been met? If that is the intention, the Government should explain how conflicts between those objectives will be resolved. I am not arguing against regulation where it is needed, but I question the idea that competition should be an end in itself. The purpose of the railway should be to serve the public, and competition should support that purpose rather than take priority over it.