Contribution
My Lords, Amendment 455 in my name seeks to preserve legal protection for unborn babies who could survive outside the womb. Clause 191 would fully decriminalise abortions by stating that a woman would commit no offence in relation to her own pregnancy. In doing so, it would disapply not only Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 but the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. This is a serious change. Much of the attention has focused on the 1861 Act, with less attention given to the removal of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which protects viable unborn babies. When the 1929 Act was passed, viability was understood to be around 28 weeks. Today, it is generally around 24 weeks, but medical advances mean that some babies can survive from around 22 weeks. Our abortion law recognises viability, and this is precisely why there is a time limit.
Clause 191 would remove protections where the death of a viable baby was caused by the mother, meaning that even a full-term baby could be aborted by the mother with no legal consequences. A baby’s protection would then depend not on whether it could survive independently but on who ended its life. This cannot be right. Under the current law, a woman at 32 weeks’ pregnancy—when a baby is fully formed—who contacts an abortion service may receive support, counselling or discuss adoption, but an abortion cannot be performed. Under Clause 191, however, she could obtain pills and end her own pregnancy without breaking the law. The consequence is clear: no prosecution at any stage, for any reason, even when a baby is capable of being born alive. That would overturn the careful balance Parliament has maintained for decades.
My amendment is deliberately modest. It allows the disapplication of Sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act but retains the 1929 Act so that the deliberate destruction of a viable unborn child remains an offence. This is not about reopening the wider abortion debate; it is about ensuring that viable babies do not lose their legal protection rights.
There are also practical concerns. Abortion pills are easily obtained and sometimes used dangerously late in pregnancy. Removing all criminal liability removes an important safeguard and may leave coercion and abuse undiscovered. Judges already exercise compassion in the very small number of cases that come before the courts. Clause 191 goes far beyond that by removing accountability altogether. The current law strikes a balance: abortion is permitted up to 24 weeks, and beyond that, only in exceptional circumstances. Removing all limits is to cross a line. Close to birth, the difference between a foetus and a newborn may be a matter of hours, yet one would be fully protected in law, while the other could lawfully be destroyed. We do not allow infanticides of newborn babies, so why should the law treat a full-term unborn baby differently?
This proposal was not in the manifesto and has had no public consultation. Such a profound change deserves scrutiny. Public support for abortion up to full term is very limited, while support for protection after viability is strong.
I do not oppose abortion in all circumstances, but diluting the already limited protection for viable unborn babies is just a step too far. Without limits backed by meaningful legal deterrent, women may come under pressure to terminate pregnancy late in their terms, sometimes against their own wishes or consent. Clause 191 may also facilitate disability-selective abortion and sex-selective abortion, placing unborn girls at particular risk. For that reason, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, to prevent sex-selective abortions, which already exist in this country.
The noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, has tabled an amendment to remove Clause 191 altogether, and I hope it will command wide support. My amendment sits alongside it and ensures that this Committee focuses clearly on what Clause 191 really does and on the rights of viable babies. If we cannot protect children at the very beginning of life, when they are at their most vulnerable, what credibility do we have when we claim to put children first? I therefore urge the Committee to reject the clause. I beg to move.