Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

My Lords, in moving Amendment 3, which is in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, I will also speak to our Amendments 4, 17 and 26. These are all probing amendments to query the definitions of relevance and recklessness, and to clarify how the duty of candour will apply to public authorities and officials in practice. We will return to some of our concerns on the practical application of the duty of candour when we debate Amendment 34, which is now in a later group. I start with Amendments 3 and 17, which I will take together because they raise the same point. They would remove the words “or may be” before the word “relevant” from Clause 2(3)(a) and from new Section 10A proposed in Schedule 1 to be inserted into the Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016. The arguments for both amendments are exactly the same. The short point is this: as drafted, Clause 2(3)(a) requires a public authority or official to “notify the person leading an inquiry or investigation where … their acts are or may be relevant”. Their acts either have to be relevant or “may be relevant”. When it comes to information, however, in Clause 2(3)(b), they have to notify the inquiry or investigation only of information that “is relevant”—not “may be relevant” but “is relevant”. That is obviously a distinction that has been considered. The distinction would indicate that the Government accept that the authority or official is capable of making a judgment on what information is relevant. However, in the case of acts, they require that same authority or official to make a notification where “their acts are or may be relevant”.