Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)

My Lords, I have six amendments in this group and will speak first on five of them—Amendments 64, 65, 67, 69 and 140. The purpose of these is to clarify which functions of higher education providers fall within the scope of Schedule 2, so that there is greater certainty about where the duty of candour and accountability apply. The Government have acknowledged that universities perform public functions, including teaching and awarding degrees, but their position leaves important questions about the boundaries of those functions to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. What about activities such as student welfare and pastoral support, safeguarding, accommodation, complaints and appeals, or the way that universities respond to serious incidents? These are a big part of what universities do, and the decisions they make can have a huge and lasting impact on students’ lives. These amendments spell out exactly which of universities’ activities I am talking about; they cover admissions and assessment, academic progression and disciplinary processes, student support and welfare, safeguarding, accommodation, complaints and appeals, and responses to serious incidents, including student deaths and subsequent investigations. These amendments seek to give us a clearer picture of which university activities should count as public functions and would help ensure that the right standards of openness and accountability apply. The importance of this question becomes painfully clear when we hear from families who have lost a child while they were at university. A parent who contacted me through ForThe100 told me that their son died by suicide in April 2022, just four hours after the university had informed him that a restriction it had already imposed upon him had been escalated to a complete ban from campus. The family had not known that he was facing disciplinary action. After his death, the parent described to me a long and difficult process of seeking answers, including the struggle to obtain information and get the university to answer their questions properly. Even after the inquest, their attempts to obtain a full response to their concerns continued for a further 18 months. Families should not have to spend years seeking information, answers and accountability while they are already dealing with an unimaginable loss. The National Review of Higher Education Student Suicide Deaths, published in 2025, recorded concerns from families about transparency, communication and their involvement in investigations. It recommended a duty of candour tailored to higher education, and those concerns underline why we need to be clear about the responsibilities that apply when universities make decisions around students’ welfare and respond to serious incidents. A government letter of 1 September recognises that some university activities are public functions, but it leaves just too many questions about the other important areas. It does not make clear how the ethical conduct requirements in Chapter 2 are intended to apply to universities. These amendments would help to clear that up. They would give universities, students and their families a clearer understanding of where these responsibilities lie, while still allowing individual circumstances to be considered. If there are concerns that extending these provisions to higher education would mean that universities become responsible for providing healthcare or guaranteeing every student’s safety, I can reassure your Lordships that this is not what these amendments are about. There is an important difference between a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm and a duty to be open and honest about what happened if something goes wrong. The Bill’s duty of candour and assistance is about openness and co-operation in the inquiries and the investigations it covers; it means being prepared to explain what an institution knew, what it did and why. I will put four specific questions to the Minister, reflecting concerns raised by families through ForThe100 on the Government’s intended treatment of higher education. Do the Government consider pastoral support, student welfare, safeguarding and university-arranged accommodation to be activities forming part of the provision of higher education? Does that extend to academic disciplinary processes, student complaints and appeals, and responses to serious incidents including student deaths? If these are public functions, is there a reason that they should not be expressly identified in Schedule 2, rather than leaving the boundaries to case-by-case judicial interpretation? How do the Government aim to ensure that Chapter 2, on ethical requirements, applies to the relevant public functions of higher education providers? I would really like the Government to explain how the Bill will operate where a university’s activities involve both public functions and arrangements with private contractors. My Amendment 66A moves on to all of your Lordships, because I do not understand why politicians like us should be held to a lower standard of honesty than other public officials. That is what this amendment is about. Why are Members of this House and other UK Parliaments and Assemblies excluded from this new offence of misleading the public? Is it clear enough when the offence applies? The Government have decided that intentionally or recklessly deceiving the public on matters of serious public concern should be a criminal offence for public officials. We are talking about serious deception proved to the criminal standard in court, not making a mistake, getting something wrong or changing your mind. The offence will apply to Ministers, civil servants, police officers, members of the Armed Forces and other public officials, but Members of this House, the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly are excluded. I simply do not understand why that distinction has been drawn. If the purpose is to improve accountability in public life, should that principle not also extend to this House—to people who actually make laws, scrutinise the Government and speak to the public on matters of national importance? There is a second issue that this amendment is for: uncertainty about when someone is acting in their official capacity. The Bill makes the offence dependent on a person acting in their capacity as a public official or public authority, but it does not clearly define what that means. People should be able to understand the law before they act. It has been raised that the Law Commission previously warned, in its examination of misconduct in public office, that the meaning of acting in an official capacity was insufficiently clear. The Bill abolishes the common law offence of misconduct in public office because of the uncertainty around it, yet the new offence of misleading the public relies on almost the same language. Should we not be careful not to repeat the very problem that the Bill is meant to address? I was going to talk about the case against Boris Johnson, but I will skip that. When creating a new criminal offence, should Parliament not seek to provide as much clarity as possible, rather than leave key questions about its scope to be settled by the courts? This amendment would bring Members of this House, the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly all into the definition of public official for the purposes of duty of candour and the offence of misleading the public. It would apply the principle of accountability to those who make our laws as well as those who implement them. Secondly, it would protect parliamentary proceedings and political opinion. Nothing said or done in the proceedings of any UK Parliament or legislature could be caught by these offences. The amendment would also expressly protect expressions of honestly held political belief or opinion by Members of those Parliaments and Assemblies, so it is not about restricting debate in Parliament or criminalising political differences; it is about holding politicians to account for serious deception. Thirdly, it would clarify when certain officeholders are acting in their official capacity and would provide that Members of this House and other UK Parliaments and Assemblies, Ministers and specified mayors are treated as acting in their official role when speaking to the public about matters of serious public concern, while they are still free to express their political views. Communications made in a judicial capacity or concerning solely private life, family life or private business are obviously excluded. Fourthly, it would clarify what constitutes harm for the purposes of the offence. It would provide that harm can include undermining public confidence in public authorities, public officials, the exercise of public functions or democratic processes. Then it identifies six purposes for which such a communication might be made. It covers situations where deception could have serious consequences, such as misleading the public to justify military action, concealing risks to public safety or misrepresenting how public money is spent. This is Bill needs clarification. I have a lot of sympathy for almost all the amendments that we have heard today. I urge the Minister and the Government to actually listen and act on what they are hearing. There are difficult questions where criminal law and political speech intersect, but difficulty is not a reason to look away; it is a reason for us to engage, examine the wording carefully and get it right. I support Amendment 66 from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, as well.