Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)

My Lords, this short group—which I hope we can take briskly—is about command responsibility. I worry that the current iteration of Clause 2(5) is practically unenforceable. The obligation to “take all reasonable steps” seems very vague for a duty that attracts non-strict criminal liability in an egregious case. My amendment supports the principle and purpose of the clause—in other words, to establish command responsibility—and would make it work better. This leadership responsibility on senior public officials is crucial in attempting to restore public trust. The sanction for breaching this duty is the criminal offence in Clause 5. It is set at an appropriately high standard: as we heard earlier, it requires proof of intention or recklessness in the sense of ignoring a foreseen risk. The Kerslake review provides an example of why the amendment is needed. In that case, a chief constable provided completely inaccurate evidence to the review, which he later accepted had been a “very grave error”—but in so doing, he attempted to blame other officers. Under the current draft, I fear he would likely avoid responsibility. Amendment 8 seeks to rectify this. If the chief constable was in fact misled by others, he would still have the legitimate Clause 5 defence of a lack of intent or recklessness. That provides the right balance. Amendment 25 is in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee. I hope they will forgive me for suggesting that, while this amendment attempts to achieve the same result, it is less effective because it does not remove the “reasonable steps” caveat that makes it so easy for a public authority leader to pass the buck. That is what I am trying to get at here. Once more, I am supported in my amendment by the Hillsborough Law Now campaign and by Justice. I beg to move.