The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)

My Lords, the Government recognise that there are strongly held views across your Lordships’ Committee on this very sensitive issue. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, is of course correct that the Government maintain a neutral stance on abortion in England and Wales. We remain of the view that it is for Parliament to decide whether it is in favour of this or not. That is not sitting on the fence—that is actually deferring to the will of Parliament. It is for Parliament to decide the circumstances under which abortion should take place, allowing your Lordships to vote according to conscience. The Government will not stand in the way of change, if that is what Parliament decides. The noble Lords, Lord Bailey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, asked what the Government intend to do in certain situations. I remind your Lordships that this was not a government amendment, and therefore it is a matter for your Lordships. If this is the will of Parliament, the Government will ensure that the law is enacted. That said, the Government must of course comment on the practical effects, workability and coherence with the statute book of any proposed legislative amendments. On 17 June last year, the Minister for Victims and Violence Against Women and Girls set out in the other place observations on what is now Clause 191. As this is already a matter of public record, I hope that your Lordships will forgive me for not repeating what she said, save that I have been asked the specific question by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Falkner, about the effect of Clause 191 on the Abortion Act in how it deals with offences. The legal position is that the Abortion Act is unaffected by Clause 191. What Clause 191 does is to disapply the offences created by Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, but only for a woman who acts in relation to her own pregnancy. The offences still apply to third parties. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that any man behaving in the way she described would still be potentially committing an offence. In order to avoid repeating myself later in this debate, I reiterate that the Government’s neutral position means that I will not be commenting beyond matters of workability and practical effect. As a shorthand, I am going to refer to conduct that could come within Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act as abortion offences. I do not intend to address all amendments. There are some, such as Amendment 455 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, where we do not consider there to be significant workability concerns, particular operational implications or unintended consequences that your Lordships may wish to consider: it is a simple policy decision to be made. If I do not refer to any particular amendment, your Lordships may safely assume that that is because the Government regard it as a policy decision for your Lordships’ House without any operational or other matters to be considered. Finally, because this is a large group of amendments, I have tried to shorten my remarks to only the parts that I regard as being essential to bring to your Lordships’ attention. If anything is unclear, I encourage any of your Lordships to write to me so that I can provide a fuller explanation. I begin with Amendment 456 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. It may be helpful for your Lordships to be aware of the usual circumstances in which certain offences require that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, more usually, or that of the Attorney-General, more rarely, is required before criminal proceedings can be instituted. Generally, the concern to the DPP will be appropriate where either it is very likely that a defendant will reasonably contend that a prosecution for the offence would violate their convention rights or where there is a high risk that the right to bring a private prosecution might be abused and, if so, the institution of proceedings would cause the defendant irreparable harm. In general, prohibiting private prosecutions and ensuring that only the Crown Prosecution Service can prosecute is the check and balance used to mitigate these risks. If an offence involves national security or has an international element, the consent of the Attorney-General may be more appropriate. In response to the question asked by the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame and Lord Bailey, as to the statistics being relied on, it is not clear to me whether the data requested is collected, but I will make inquiries and write to the noble Lord. I turn to Amendment 459 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton. I can reassure the noble Baroness that the Government are clear that the law is also clear: sex is not itself a lawful ground for termination of pregnancy under the Abortion Act 1967. I can also reassure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on the same point. Accordingly, any third party, including registered medical practitioners, who terminates a pregnancy on the basis of the sex of the foetus alone would also be liable to prosecution under the relevant offences relating to abortion. Turning to Amendments 459B and 502A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, it is worth noting that, as currently drafted, the deadline for the Secretary of State to lay the draft regulations and the deadline for Parliament to approve those regulations is the same in this amendment. Practically, then, the effect might be that, if the Secretary of State lays the regulations on the final day permitted, Parliament would not then have sufficient time to approve them before the deadline. As a result, Clause 191 would automatically cease to have effect, even though the Minister had complied with the requirement to lay the regulations. It is unclear from the amendment as drafted whether that is the noble Baroness’s intention or whether she intends to give sufficient time for both these processes to take place. Amendment 460 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who is no longer in her place, would mean that women would no longer be able to have a consultation over the phone or by other electronic means before being able to self-administer medicine for early medical abortion at home, as is current practice. Instead, women would be required to attend an in-person consultation first before being able to take pills at home. The Committee may wish to note that the overall effect of this new clause would be to limit access to home use of early medical abortion pills because of lack of resources for abortion providers to hold in-person consultations. It could also reduce women’s access to early medical abortion due to travel distances, if they live in remote areas, or if they have difficulties attending a clinic for different reasons—for example, vulnerable women, women from more deprived backgrounds or women subject to coercion. The Government wish your Lordships to be aware that, given that the majority of abortions take place via this method, this new clause is likely to have a significant operational impact on access to abortions. That said, this is, of course, a matter of policy for Parliament. Amendment 461H in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, is similar to Amendment 460 in that it seeks to introduce a requirement for an in-person consultation before medication to terminate a pregnancy may be lawfully prescribed. In addition, Amendment 461H would also require a scan, or what is described as a “clinically equivalent” alternative, to be conducted for all women to determine gestation before being able to take pills at home, whereas the current process is that an ultrasound scan is provided only in certain conditions where there is any uncertainty about gestation or where there is clinical need. As drafted, it is unclear what is meant by “other clinically equivalent means” when determining the pregnancy’s gestation. Your Lordships may also wish to consider the likelihood that Amendment 461H would also result in additional costs being incurred because of either additional machines having to be bought and staff trained to provide an ultrasound for every woman seeking an early medical abortion, or the alternative, which would be to remove scanning capacity from the provision for other needs. Operationally, the requirement to have a face-to-face appointment and scan may also introduce additional waiting times for abortion care. This would have a particularly negative impact on those awaiting early medical abortion, but it might also have an impact on abortions at a later stage because of loss of system capacity. This could have the effect—unintended, we presume—of more abortions taking place later on. As with Amendment 460, the overall effect of this new clause would be to limit access to home use of early medical abortion pills because of resource issues in relation to the requirement in every case to hold in-person consultations and offer scans. Amendment 461A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to apply the criminal standard of proof to medical assessments and decision-making. Your Lordships may wish to note that the operational effect of this additional burden of proof is that it is likely that women would no longer have a consultation over the telephone or by other electronic means before being prescribed medicine for early medical abortion at home, as is the current practice. Instead, women would need to attend an in-person consultation and have an ultrasound. So, for similar reasons to those I have already given in relation to Amendments 460 and 461H, Amendment 461A is likely to limit access to home use of early medical abortion pills and thus result in more abortions being undertaken at later gestation. Amendment 461, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, seeks to create a new offence of intentionally encouraging or assisting a termination that is contrary to the Abortion Act 1967. We understand the noble Baroness’s amendment to be intended to work in the following way: a person would be guilty of committing such an offence whether or not a successful termination occurs and the amendment would also require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the offence following consultation with appropriate stakeholders. Clause 191 provides that a pregnant woman cannot commit an abortion offence in relation to her own pregnancy, meaning such terminations would no longer be considered unlawful under the Abortion Act 1967. As a result, Amendment 461 would apply only where a third party encourages or assists someone other than the pregnant woman. Your Lordships should be aware that this is already captured by existing encouraging or assisting offences under the Serious Crime Act 2015. Therefore, Amendment 461 would create an overlapping offence. Additionally, your Lordships may wish to note that, in any event, third parties can also still be prosecuted at the moment under primary offences such as Sections 58 or 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 or the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. I turn now to Amendment 461B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. Safeguarding is an essential aspect of abortion care and all abortion providers are already required to have effective arrangements in place to safeguard children and vulnerable adults in compliance with the department’s required standard operating procedures for the approval of independent sector places for termination of pregnancy in England. Your Lordships may wish to consider that the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health has published national safeguarding guidance for under-18s accessing early medical abortion services, which seeks to ensure that all abortion providers have robust safeguarding in place. We expect all providers to have due regard to this safeguarding guidance.