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Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]

Speaking in the House of Lords on 15 October 2026

Debate

Local Government: Democratic Accountability, Participation and Electoral Reform

Contribution

My Lords, as someone who watches most proceedings in the House, albeit remotely, I personally pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, as he leaves the House, for his great service—and I mean great service—particularly in the handling of legislation. He will be surprised to know how often I have agreed with his comments during his interventions over the years. I wish him well, as will the whole House. I wish to concentrate my remarks on democratic accountability and the benefits of electoral reform. The comments of the Prime Minister at the party conference debate are welcome. In 1989, during a number of rather heated discussions over dinner in the Commons among four former MP colleagues, Brian Sedgemore, Ann Clwyd, Roland Boyes—all now sadly deceased—and me, I argued the case for electoral reform. In the absence of any agreement, I offered to go away and design a new electoral system which offered an element of greater proportionality. Over the following 12 months, I designed that new system and named it the supplementary vote. The original research papers are now archived in my son’s office in the House of Commons. The system was subsequently adopted by the Nolan commission in 1997 and was introduced in both mayoral and police commissioner elections shortly after. To give the system academic credibility, I was able to secure support for the work from an eminent former LSE academic, Professor Patrick Dunleavy, whose substantial reputation gave the work academic credibility. He monitored the work, as my researcher, James Mahon, and Commons Library researchers carried the work forward. The supplementary vote, not to be confused with the contingent vote, survived two decades, until Prime Minister Johnson decided to abolish it, believing mistakenly it damaged the Conservative vote—a big mistake, as Conservative electoral number crunchers have increasingly realised. Added to that have been the widely held concerns of PR enthusiasts over alternative forms of PR which destroy the constituency link. Recently, the Prime Minister announced his wish to reopen the discussion on electoral reform, and, as I understand it, he has proposed that a working group be established to consider various options for reform. For obvious reasons, I would like to be considered as a member of that committee, but my disability—working remotely—rules me out. However, I would like to think that the supplementary vote would be on that agenda and would now in the light of experience perhaps go further with possible future amendment. In a bid to secure even greater proportionality, there is an argument that supplementary vote should be subject to a limited element of top-up off a list—SV plus. I have been giving such an arrangement considerable thought over recent weeks. A list member could be elected as an additional member on a regional basis to a group of perhaps 10 directly elected MPs. That would give us a Commons of approximately 590 directly elected, and 60 from the list. The list could be regional or national. There are however dangers, primarily that of list members using their positions to displace individual directly elected members. This would arise where list members in multimember constituencies concentrate their efforts on targeting an individual constituency, their motive being to replace an existing directly elected member in a subsequent election. The answer is to introduce a restriction on movement from list membership to directly elected membership of the House. I would like to see at least a five-year block on movement. That would kill the incentive to play the system and undermine directly elected constituency members. However, there is a problem with that as a solution. It may raise questions of rights. I recognise that such a system is not challenging the right to stand for Parliament. However, it is applying a restriction on that right. It is to that issue that I am having to give more thought, and on which I am looking for further advice. I have to confess that, over the years, I, too, have flirted with wider systems of proportional representation, in particular, multimember constituencies, but they have all fallen on the problems of breaking the constituency link and the duplication of unhealthy competition in the representation of constituents. I sense from colleagues across Europe, and now our latest conversations in Scotland, who have experienced multimember constituencies that they are not always conducive to healthy interparty and intermember relationships. I suppose, in truth, I am fearful of any electoral system that breaks the vital link between the identifiable MP and the constituency. Direct, individual MP accountability is critical, and any list system must be very small and built in such a way as to avoid conflict. That is all I need to say at this stage. This is no doubt the beginning of a long discussion, and I am sure there will be times in the future when I will no doubt wish to intervene as the debate further develops, albeit remotely.

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