Sir Julian Lewis

Having listened to all the excellent preceding speeches, I have to say that occasions such as this make me proud to be a Member of the British Parliament. I congratulate everyone who has spoken with such a united voice. If I may, I will just make some brief elaborations on the opening comments and superb contribution of the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel). He referred in particular to the non-recognition of the Baltic states, and it is worth looking at that a little more closely. The Baltic states were occupied and incorporated into the Soviet Union for approximately half a century; never did this country recognise that. If those of us who saw the Soviet Union at the height of its power in the mid-1980s had been told that one day the Governments in exile of those three absorbed republics would be able to step forward and pick up the torch of democracy owing to the collapse of their overlords, we would have said, “Well, we would love to think that would happen, but do we honestly think it is going to happen in our lifetimes? Probably not.” But it did, and when it did, the implosion was dramatic, unexpected and complete. [Dawn Butler in the Chair] Yet there are some people who regard the break-up—the dissolution—of the Soviet empire as a geopolitical disaster. Hon. Members know to whom I am referring in particular: Vladimir Putin. Given that that is Putin’s attitude, one thing that we can certainly deduce from the present situation is that there is no such thing as a peace deal to be had with Vladimir Putin and his cohorts. The fact is that if there is a deal of any sort—if there is a ceasefire—it is for one reason and one reason only: that Putin feels at the time of such a deal or a ceasefire that he cannot successfully go further. If then there is a cessation of fighting for a while, we can be equally sure that the moment Putin thinks he can go further, he will start all over again. So there is absolutely nothing to be gained, in terms of good will, or a basis for future relationships or stability, by giving any concessions to Putin whatsoever in terms of land exchanges or recognition of occupation. Let me turn to another parallel with the 1930s—the fact that Putin made one big error. He signalled by his early occupation of Crimea what his intentions were, but he was not then able to carry them out for quite a few years, in which time the defensive capability of the Ukrainians had massively increased with the surreptitious help, I suspect, of certain western powers, including ourselves. As a result, Ukraine was able to put up a much stronger defence than anybody who was not part of that secret rearmament and training programme would have anticipated.