Contribution
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Wolfson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, have provided the Committee with a very good curtain-raiser for Amendment 35.
This amendment stands with Amendments 51 and 61, in my name and those of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lords, Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I am grateful to them, and indeed to other Members of your Lordships’ House who spoke at Second Reading and between then and now on this issue of one central ethical code.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, for his unfailing courtesy and engagement. He met my former Liverpool constituents, the mother and the sister of Andrew Devine, the 97th fatality at Hillsborough, and heard their anxieties about a plethora of conflicting and inconsistent codes of conduct, instead of one clear central code, capable of adding codicils or variations but clear on its essential elements. I acknowledge at the outset the importance of securing the enactment of this Bill without unnecessary delay, and I certainly have no intention of adding to that delay. I might say that I have just spotted the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, also in her place, and she too met the family of Andrew Devine. Both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, as Ministers, have been exemplary in the way that they have dealt with the families still suffering grief after all this time.
The proposals in these amendments rest on three linked pillars: first, a single core code of ethical conduct; secondly, an effective framework for considering civil sanctions for serious non-compliance, and, thirdly, education and cultural change. In a way, each one reinforces the other. Clear standards should be understood, serious breaches must carry credible consequences, and our ambition must be to prevent misconduct in the first place.
Although Hillsborough brought us to this point, the Bill must serve far more than those affected by Hillsborough or by other disasters involving many victims. We have heard many of them referred to during earlier parts of our proceedings today. The protection afforded by a core code and the means of securing accountability for its serious breach must never depend on the number of victims or the profile or the publicity which their case receives.
I want to acknowledge a letter which the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, sent me only this morning, following a question that I raised last week in Committee and also at Second Reading concerning the duty of candour on universities where a student or academic may have died by suicide. That letter has been placed in the Library, and I hope that we can consider its implications on another group of amendments later in our proceedings. It obviously also has some relevance on a code of conduct that should be applicable to all.
The first pillar I have referred to is the core code, a single national code that would state the obligations everyone exercising public functions should recognise: honesty, integrity, candour, accountability, the proper keeping and disclosure of information, the correction of known error and service to the public. The Government said in answer to my Question HL3290 that approximately 6 million public sector workers are within scope of the requirement of codes. That is a powerful reason to make the common ethical foundation clear, accessible and consistent. In Answers to HL3135 and HL3136, Ministers have emphasised flexibility for individual authorities. I accept that need, but why should flexibility prevent a common minimum standard? If approximately 6 million people are covered across a large number of authorities, it makes little sense for each to reinvent substantially the same fundamental ethical obligations.
The common core should be worked out, consulted upon, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said a few moments ago, and approved nationally. Authorities could then add specialist provisions. That would promote consistent understanding, avoid near identical codes and simplify future revisions. The code need not be fixed for all time in primary legislation. The Act can provide the authority, purposes, consultation duties and safeguards as our amendment seeks to do. The detailed core code and subsequent revisions could be made by, as we have argued, delegated legislation subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament. Parliamentary control and practical flexibility can then reinforce one another.
The second pillar of the amendment concerns sanctions. We are not asking Parliament now to fix the amount of a civil penalty, prescribe pension-related consequences or enact a completed sanctions scheme, but we do ask for a proper process of consultation and legislative development addressing the nature of sanctions, independent investigation and decision-making, fair procedures and appeal. Any eventual penalties must have adequate statutory authority and proper parliamentary scrutiny.
In November 2025, Sir Keir Starmer referred to disciplinary sanctions, including gross misconduct. At Second Reading on 1 September, the noble Lord spoke of expectations and consequences for breaches. The Government’s 2026 February annual report responding to the Grenfell Tower inquiry referred to departmental discipline and sanctions for egregious breaches. The outstanding question is how to make the principle effective where present mechanisms leave gaps. If enforcement is wholly at the discretion of individual authorities, common standards may be enforced inconsistently. One authority may investigate rigorously while another does not. Institutional self-interest, reputation or seniority may influence decisions or appear to do so.
One gap we might consider arises when serious misconduct does not appropriately lead to criminal proceedings, but internal employment discipline is inadequate. Another arises where the individual has retired, resigned, transferred or otherwise left office before a complaint is resolved. In reply to my Question HL3137, the noble Lord said that authorities are responsible for disciplinary consequences for those who work for them, but that does not answer the question of what happens when they no longer do. The consultation should address that question expressly with fair time limits and protection against retrospective punishment.
In HL3138 I asked how an individual could obtain an independent investigation and a remedy where internal discipline was inappropriate. The answer was that methods and outcomes depend on the circumstances and the authority. How, then, are the public to have confidence in consistent and independent enforcement, particularly where the authority itself is implicated? What common minimum safeguards will prevent serious cases being overlooked? Honest mistakes promptly disclosed and corrected should not be treated like deliberate concealment, obstruction, retaliation or persistent misconduct.
The third pillar of these amendments is education and sustained cultural change. The ambition should extend beyond instructing current public servants about employment obligations. The national core code should become a common civic standard. Its principles of honesty, candour, accurate records, fair treatment, correcting mistakes and raising concerns should be taught progressively from an early age. Citizens would then know what to expect of those exercising public power. A junior official could refer to a recognised common code when questioning an improper instruction. I ask the noble Lord to involve the Department for Education in considering teaching materials, consultation with teachers, a modest pilot and evaluation, building on existing citizenship education. Education alone is insufficient. Sanctions cannot create ethical culture. Together with leadership and fair enforcement, they offer a prospect of prevention.
Let me also briefly cite international comparisons, which offer useful experience, not ready-made templates. The United States has common federal executive branch ethics standards and ethics training; Canada has a federal values and ethics code with organisational supplements; Australia has statutory public service standards and graduated employment sanctions; New Zealand has an updated public sector code, effective in March this year, with common standards and organisational supplementation; and Ireland has an ethics commission with complaints investigation functions. These systems differ constitutionally and in scope. The relevant questions are: how common and specialist standards fit together, how guidance and training work, who examines serious complaints where an authority is implicated, and what happens after employment ends. Australian public service guidance, for example, makes it clear that employment sanctions cannot be imposed on a former employee. Consultation should test both the strengths and limitations of such approaches before any model is adopted.
Then, there is the question of economy. A common ethical foundation, drafted once, could reduce duplication in drafting, legal review, publication, training and revision. Amendment 51 concerns consultation and parliamentary process; Amendment 61 seeks consistency between the national core and other guidance, and they complement Amendment 35.
I ask the Government to accept the three principles I have outlined to the Committee: a common ethical foundation capable of revision under parliamentary control; consultation on proportionate and independently administered civil consequences for serious misconduct, including after departure from public employment; and education and sustained leadership as part of the cultural change. I beg to move.
Amendment 35A (to Amendment 35)