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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 21 October 2026

Debate

Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Contribution

My Lords, all the amendments to Clause 13 in this group tidy up, rationalise and clarify the important new misconduct in public office offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, explained, Amendments 81, 83 and 84 make it clear that it is the intent that matters and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that a benefit is obtained by the defendant or that anyone else has suffered a detriment. As the noble Lord also explained, that represents the conclusion of the Law Commission and is powerfully endorsed by the briefing that we have received from Spotlight on Corruption, to which I am grateful. Amendments 83 and 84 are to the same effect. Amendment 85 would replace the reasonable excuse defence with a public interest defence. Again, the Law Commission supported that and the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has spoken to it. I say only this to the Minister. When he responded to the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, on Monday, which would substitute a public interest defence for the reasonable excuse defence in the Bill, in the offence of misleading the public, he said: “While acting in the public interest could be the basis of a defence, we think that, for a new offence of this kind, covering as it does all statements made by Ministers and public officials on a wide range of matters, it is important to retain the breadth of a reasonable excuse defence”.—[Official Report, 19/10/26; col. 571.] I have no wish to criticise the reasoning of the Minister or his brief, but I did not understand that answer as justifying a catch-all defence of reasonable excuse to an offence which has as its minimum ingredients both an intention to mislead the public—or recklessness as to whether the public will be misled—and knowledge on the part of the defendant that the defendant’s act is seriously improper. I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that, together, those requirements represent a high bar or a high threshold for guilt. We can argue, as we did on Monday, that the definition of “seriously improper” needs tidying up, but it seems to me, as it seemed to the Law Commission, that a public interest defence is much more appropriate than a reasonable excuse defence for this offence—as it was for the offence of misleading the public. This is Committee on an important Bill on which the Law Commission has expressed a relatively strong view which is supported by the Minister’s immediate predecessor. I accept that he may find that a little unusual but, in the circumstances, it might be best for the Government simply to accept Amendment 85. I also suggest, for the reasons given by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, that it would be sensible to accept Amendment 86, which raises the hurdle for a defendant against whom the principal ingredients of the offence are proved and who wishes to raise a defence, whether of public interest, as we suggest, or of reasonable excuse, as per the unamended Bill. I contend that exactly the same reasoning applies to Amendments 88 and 89, relating to the Clause 14 offence of breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury, again for the reasons that the noble Baroness raised.

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