Contribution
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their participation in this debate. It has raised some incredibly important issues which I have discussed with Members of your Lordships’ House from this Dispatch Box on numerous occasions.
I hope noble Lords will bear with me as I work my way through each point. I will begin with Amendment 115, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. In certain cases, courts can impose a compensation order on an offender, requiring them to make financial reparations to the victim for any personal injury, loss or damage resulting from breaches of the duty of candour. Although we recognise that breaches of the duty of candour at an inquiry or investigation may have a significant impact on those affected by the incident under investigation, the duty is towards the inquiry or the investigation itself. In that sense, the breach will affect all participants or interested persons. As much as I sympathise with the recommendations and the noble Baroness’s efforts, it would be exceptionally challenging to attempt a link of breach with any particular victim. That requires us to look at this in a slightly different way.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I have discussed the detail of IBCA on many occasions across this Dispatch Box. I truly have heard her concerns and those of the NAO about the events that led to its creation, implementation and rollout. Of course, I am always happy to have a meeting with the noble Baroness on this issue; it is something she knows that I care passionately about and would welcome such an opportunity. Having said that, she is very aware, as I am, that the infected blood compensation scheme is one of the examples that has been used to establish a compensation scheme in relation to a specific incident. The Government’s position is that this is best done on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the factors specific to each case, but the noble Baroness is right to raise the issue of institutional knowledge and making sure that we do not start from scratch all over again. There is a conversation to be had.
I turn to Amendments 123 and 146, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. We recognise the importance of ensuring that survivors can engage with proceedings and participate effectively in processes where the court has made an independent decision to invite them to play a formal role as an interested person or core participant. However, beginning with inquests, a seriously injured survivor who is also a family member of the deceased may already be eligible for legal aid under the Bill, provided its statutory conditions are met. The role of other survivors at an inquest is different and will depend on the circumstances of the case.
Importantly, the purpose of the inquest is to investigate a death, not to make findings about serious injury or other harm. Although in some cases the coroner may make an independent judicial decision that a survivor is an interested person, others may be more likely to be called as witnesses. We therefore do not consider that everyone who is seriously injured in the same incident should automatically receive non-means-tested legal aid. That could have a much broader effect than intended and create unintended consequences.
Secondly, turning to inquiries, there is already a statutory route through which public funding can be provided for legal representation. Section 40 of the Inquiries Act 2005 allows the chair of a statutory inquiry to make an award for legal representation where the chair considers that appropriate. This power is available in relation to people giving evidence and people with a sufficient interest in the proceedings or outcome of the inquiry. Inquiry chairs have used this mechanism to provide publicly funded legal representation, subject to the conditions set out for the inquiry. Introducing civil legal aid alongside those requirements would create an unnecessary parallel system and could cause confusion about how participants’ legal services should be funded.
Furthermore, these amendments would require the new entitlement to take effect immediately. We are allowing three months for the regulations needed to bring the relevant services into scope and amend the merits criteria. This would result in the Lord Chancellor being under a duty to make legal aid available in these circumstances before the necessary statutory legislation was in place, and provides insufficient lead-in time to make the necessary operational changes.
I turn to Amendment 121 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin. Every one of us owes a huge debt of gratitude to the noble Baroness for her extraordinary work on behalf of the victims of the Windrush scandal, ensuring that even today, and every day, they are not forgotten. That is incredibly powerful and I am very grateful for her work. On the amendment, the legal aid provisions in the Bill are intended to support bereaved families at inquests and represent the largest expansion of civil legal aid in a decade. Similarly to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, Amendment 121 would amount to a further expansion of legal aid provision and would therefore require careful consideration of the policy rationale, the costs involved and the wider implications for the legal aid framework.