Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, not least for stepping in and giving us the opportunity to hear such a clear exposition of the purpose of the order that we are debating this afternoon. Of course, the order adds continuity of telecommunications services to the public interest considerations specified under the Enterprise Act 2002. If these things are a minority sport, I am sorry to say that I have been playing it a long time, as I was on the Standing Committee on the Enterprise Bill in 2002 and was also around when, under the Communications Act, we put the news media and others into the specified considerations. I also probably participated in debates in 2020 putting public health into the specified considerations.
This is a short debate with a limited number of participants, but it is quite an important debate. In the past, adding specified considerations has always been regarded as a significant step that we should consider very carefully. This order, which puts this issue into the specified considerations for when the public interest intervention notice can be issued, is a recognition of the importance of the objective. Things such emergency calls, hospital communications, medical alarms and the activities of businesses dependent on reliable connectivity are all important and we must protect those services. Indeed, the particular point of this is to protect vulnerable customers.
However, the order also extends ministerial discretion within merger control. We should therefore examine how that discretion will be exercised, how competition will be preserved or promoted, and whether another framework for company failure could reduce the need to rely on it. The immediate context is BT’s acquisition of TalkTalk’s consumer and wholesale businesses. Ofcom has explained that failure could affect vulnerable customers served indirectly through resellers as well as people whose telephone numbers have been transferred from TalkTalk to other providers but whose services still depend on its network. Those are serious risks. Nevertheless, customers also have a lasting interest in effective competition, choice, fair prices, innovation and investment. The acquisition of a competitor by a dominant operator requires proper examination, even where the circumstances demand urgency.
I am not asking the Minister to prejudge the Competition and Markets Authority’s conclusions. Indeed, we do not know what its conclusions are. The letter was delivered in the afternoon of 19 October and the conclusions have not yet been published. I am however asking for assurance that the public interest consideration will supplement rigorous competition scrutiny and will not become a reason to dispense with it.
Under this framework, the Secretary of State determines the overall public interest outcome. Following a detailed investigation, she must accept the CMA’s finding on whether there is an anti-competitive outcome, but she may weigh that against the specified public interest considerations. The choice of remedies, therefore, involves ministerial judgment.
That distinction matters. A conclusion that an acquisition is necessary to preserve services does not establish that every competition remedy would threaten continuity. A remedy protecting wholesale access or competing providers may be entirely compatible with uninterrupted service. Any decision to reject, weaken or defer a recommended pro-competition remedy should, therefore, be specifically justified.
That brings me to the alternative approach to which I referred. On 17 March this year, during Ofcom’s analyst and investor call, Natalie Black, who is Ofcom’s group director for infrastructure and connectivity, stated:
“We don’t have a special administration regime in the UK”.
She described arrangements for protecting consumers in co-operation with the department, but she identified no statutory telecoms special administration regime.
Water legislation provides an instructive comparison. It expressly provides for continuity following a licensed supplier’s exit and allows Ofwat to direct eligible replacement suppliers to take responsibility. The eligibility requirements qualify that power, but the mechanism exists. The telecommunications industry has arrangements that it describes as the “supplier of last resort”. The published process relies on best efforts by upstream providers, envisages eventual disconnection and would be superseded by an administration. It does not, therefore, provide statutory customer allocation, as in the water industry case.
So, should we consider a framework that allows Ofcom to seek a court-appointed special administrator to maintain essential networks while a business is restructured or transferred, alongside arrangements for replacement suppliers to take responsibility for customers? Such a framework would not necessarily remove every need for this public interest consideration, but it could reduce the need to invoke continuity as a justification for accepting what might potentially be lasting competition harm. A statutory special administration regime could, therefore, address both problems by maintaining essential services during failure and ensuring that customers could be transferred in an orderly manner if the business could not be saved.
Such a regime would require legislation, appropriate funding arrangements and design. However, in the first instance, the Government could establish which elements Ofcom could introduce under its existing powers and which additional powers would then be required from Parliament. The choice should not be presented as one between continuity and competition; a properly designed failure regime could protect both. It could keep essential services operating, give regulators time to identify alternative purchases, enable orderly customer transfers and ensure that competition remedies were properly tested before any acquisition was approved.
I ask the Minister to respond on four points. First, can she confirm that the Government will treat effective Competition and Markets Authority competition remedies as a priority objective, and depart from them only where the Secretary of State publishes a clear explanation of both the continuity risk and why a pro-competitive option would not suffice?
Secondly, will she ensure that the CMA’s report on the BT and TalkTalk transaction is made available to Parliament promptly, subject to the necessary confidentiality protections? I would have liked to have seen it and read it, together with the Government’s response and the reasons for any decision affecting competition, before this debate, but, clearly, that has not happened.
Thirdly, can the Minister commit to requiring that any undertakings accepted in the public interest contain precise obligations, independent monitoring and meaningful consequences for breaches—including protections for wholesale customers, resellers and competing providers, where necessary?
Fourthly, I ask the Minister to review with Ofcom the case for a telecommunications special administration regime, including statutory customer allocation arrangements, and to publish the conclusions from such a review with a timetable for deciding whether legislation is required.