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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 28 October 2026

Debate

Human Rights Act 1998 (Remedial) Order 2026

Contribution

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this order, but I immediately say that I align myself entirely with the observations made by my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy. We are dealing, on the surface, with what appears to be a very simple and straightforward order, but below that simple surface there is a raging sea of contention and debate. It is one that should be addressed by Parliament in the form of primary legislation, not by Ministers in the form of remedial orders. When the Human Rights Act was passed, Parliament ensured that all aspects of the principle of judicial independence and immunity—what the Minister, rightly, referred to as a long-established common-law principle and a foundational constitutional issue—were preserved by Section 9 of the Act. There is a minor exception with regard to where someone has been detained, but that does not impact directly on the issue. The concept of judicial independence is central to our common-law system of justice. I will come back to this point, but I make the observation that this is less easily identified in many continental legal systems. Many of those legal systems make up the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, so there is, if you like, a potential divergence in the view taken on judicial immunity and judicial independence between common-law systems such as our own and continental systems. Five years ago, in 2021—I emphasise 2021—in the case of SW v the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights intruded on the issue of the immunity and independence of the judiciary by determining that a remedy in the form of damages should be available where there was potentially a breach of Article 8 of the convention. It is in that context that we are now presented with the remedial order. When the Human Rights Act was being debated nearly 30 years ago, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, set out that the power in Section 10 to make a remedial order was to be conferred only in exceptional circumstances. It was a power to be exercised lightly. It is a point reinforced by the terms of Section 10 itself. Noble Lords may wish to refer to the Explanatory Memorandum at paragraph 6.3, which emphasises this. Section 10(2) of the Human Rights Act requires that a Minister must consider there to be “compelling reasons” for making an amendment by way of a remedial order. I emphasise “compelling reasons”. Five years after the judgment, Sir Peter Gross and his board determined that there could never or should never be compelling reasons to amend the Human Rights Act itself—the foundational document—by means of a remedial order. There may be cases with regard to other primary legislation where such a remedial order would be appropriate but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, pointed out, it is a power to be conferred or exercised lightly and not one to be deployed with regard to the foundational principles of human rights as expressed in the Human Rights Act. In attempting to meet the requirement for compelling reasons, we are told: “We consider there is little prospect of finding suitable primary legislation to make an amendment in the near future. We consider that the nature of the incompatibility contributes to there being compelling reasons for making the necessary legislative change swiftly”. Is this swiftly? The European Court of Human Rights opined on this matter more than five years ago. As regards compelling reasons, when the Minister presented this order, he did so under the non-urgent procedure. There is nothing compelling about any of this. This is an issue that should properly be brought before Parliament in the form of primary legislation, and the absence of a suitable vehicle is of little moment. Indeed, I happen to notice that we are at present debating the Courts and Tribunals Bill. Will the Minister confirm to me that he has checked whether this provision would fall within the competence of that Bill? No doubt he has addressed that issue, given the way in which the Explanatory Memorandum is set out, but other legislation could be made available. In these circumstances, what we are actually seeing is the developing jurisprudence of the court in Strasbourg intruding upon the primary legislation of our sovereign Parliament in an area of fundamental constitutional importance and, five years later, a Minister laying an order under the non-urgent procedure seeking to maintain that somehow there is an issue of urgency and a compelling reason to intrude upon a fundamental constitutional right and protection. The time has come for the Government and Parliament to consider the increasing intrusion into our parliamentary sovereignty of an ever-evolving jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, particularly when the jurisprudence is significantly and materially influenced by continental lawyers unfamiliar with our common-law based system. I suggest that the remedial order sets not only a very bad but a very sad precedent.

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