Contribution
My Lords, I will speak to this group and move Amendment 61 on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, alongside speaking to Amendment 158 in my name.
Amendment 61
“requires the Secretary of State to prepare, maintain, and lay before Parliament a Digital Sovereignty and Resilience Strategy”.
In modern cyber defence, we must know not just how we will defend our networks but whose technology we are relying on to do so. The strategy establishes a statutory digital sovereignty dashboard developed in consultation with the NCSC, the Competition and Markets Authority, the ONS and the AI Security Institute. This dashboard would monitor foreign state dependencies, supply chain bottlenecks and the security of core sovereign data assets, including NHS records, BBC archives and meteorological data. It will provide the evidence base needed to reform government procurement, promote resilient UK-developed technology and safeguard critical open source software. We cannot build genuine cyber resilience on borrowed or vulnerable foundations.
The Government cannot continue to substitute a disparate list of commercial partnerships and piecemeal initiatives for an overarching, statutory digital sovereignty strategy. True digital sovereignty is not merely a question of data residency, of where servers happen to be located; it is about decision rights, operational agency and jurisdictional immunity. When key public functions, policing databases and essential national infrastructure are underpinned by foreign-owned platforms, subject to extraterritorial levers such as the US CLOUD Act, the UK exposes itself to acute single-point-of-failure vulnerabilities and sudden regulatory hostage taking. Relying on the good intentions of overseas boardrooms or transient administrative commitments is a fragile foundation for our national resilience.
Amendment 61 provides the clarity and coherence we currently lack. It would require Ministers to audit our strategic dependencies, benchmark foreign ownership across critical systems and ensure that Britain retains the statutory levers, open technical architectures and domestic capability needed to control its own digital future. This amendment mirrors the amendment so powerfully championed in another place by my honourable friend Victoria Collins, alongside our honourable friend Freddie van Mierlo. As she warned, in an unstable world, true cyber resilience cannot exist without a statutory strategy to confront foreign supplier dependency and build sovereign capability. It is in that same spirit of transparency and digital integrity that I warmly welcome Amendment 165, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moraes.
I turn next to Amendment 158, which stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. This new clause would
“place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to review, within 12 months, whether a statutory defence under section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990”
should be introduced for legitimate, “good-faith cyber security researchers” and threat intelligence practitioners, and to report the findings to Parliament. I made the case as strongly as I could in Grand Committee.
Competitor jurisdictions, including the United States, France and Belgium, have already updated their laws to provide legal certainty for ethical research. The Pro-innovation Regulation of Technologies Review from the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, explicitly recommended introducing a statutory public interest defence. Amendment 158 does not write the defence into law today. It would simply place a statutory obligation on the Government to conclude their discussions with the CyberUp campaign and industry within 12 months and lay concrete proposals before Parliament. It is time to untie the hands of our cyber defenders. I beg to move Amendment 61.