Contribution
My Lords, the amendments in this group seek an early review of various aspects of the legislative and regulatory framework. Amendment 163 would require the Government, within a year of Royal Assent, to undertake and publish extensive reviews of the NIS regime, including its institutional architecture—what regulator does what and the scope of activities it regulates. This was set out by the noble Lords, Lord Birt and Lord Londesborough, and the aspect relating to AISI was set out by the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko.
I caution noble Lords that this amendment would commit the Government to reopening the fundamental basis of how cyber security is overseen in the UK on an annual basis. This would create a destabilising and uncertain regulatory, business and investment environment. Although it is right that we consider how best the NIS regime can be used to protect the cyber security of the UK’s most essential services, I am concerned about conducting the wide-ranging and comprehensive review envisaged by the amendment within a year of the Bill’s passing and every single year thereafter. I am deeply concerned that this will be a distraction from the effective implementation of the changes that the Bill introduces and the reviews of scope that noble Lords and I have discussed during its passage. The imperative, once the Bill passes, should be to focus on working with regulators and regulated sectors to ensure that the updated regime delivers its objective of improving the cyber security and resilience of the UK’s essential services. These are risks we see every day.
On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, as I set out in response to the earlier group, the Government are not supportive of giving AISI some of the roles he described. We want to focus on working to deliver the security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation and partnering with regulators to ensure that they have the capability needed to enforce the updated regime. I strongly believe that we should allow time for these changes to be introduced and bed in before we undertake such a wide-ranging review of their effectiveness.
I recognise the strength of feeling expressed by Peers in this and previous debates about the importance of critical services not currently in scope of the Bill having adequate cyber security defences. Building on previous discussions, I can today commit that, within 12 months of the Bill passing, the Secretary of State will lay a Statement setting out whether future CNI activities should be brought into scope of the NIS regulations.
As set out in the Bill, for something to be defined as a new essential activity, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the activity is essential to the economy or day-to-day functioning of society in all or part of the UK. A 12-month review of scope will allow the Secretary of State to conduct an evidence-based assessment, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, of whether they consider other sectors would meet this test and the suitability of bringing them in scope of the regime. Once the review is completed and the Statement laid, the Government could then consult on which of those sectors could be added. To ensure there is focus on the areas where the impact of a cyber incident would be greatest, the review will focus on CNI sectors not currently in scope of the NIS or the Bill, including, for instance, government and the food sector. I believe that this approach, focusing on the implementation of the Bill with a targeted review of where the UK’s most critical services should be brought into scope, will best enable us to deliver our objectives ahead of a comprehensive post-implementation review within three years of Royal Assent.
I reassure noble Lords that, under the Bill’s current provisions, such a post-implementation review will be able to consider the effectiveness of the regime’s institutional architecture. I hope that noble Lords are reassured by this approach and that the amendment will be withdrawn.