M
Member
Speaking in the House of Lords on 26 October 2026
Debate
Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) BillContribution
163: After Clause 58, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of the effectiveness of the NIS regime(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, carry out a review of the effectiveness of this Act and the NIS Regulations in securing the security and resilience of the network and information systems on which the economy and the day-to-day functioning of society in the United Kingdom depend.(2) In particular, the review must, in the context of the regulatory system established by this Act and the NIS Regulations—(a) identify the categories of organisation, in both the public and private sectors, that have a material impact on the economy, society or national defence and security, and identify what obligations could be placed upon them to improve their cyber resilience,(b) review the critical vulnerabilities of technology platforms and identify what obligations could be placed on technology providers to supply safe services, and to address vulnerabilities when they occur, and(c) review the options for regulating organisations and technology providers to promote cyber resilience.(3) The review must consider—(a) the sectors and activities currently within scope;(b) the management of supply chain risks;(c) whether further sectors and activities should be specified as essential activities under section 24(3), or otherwise brought within the scope of the NIS Regulations, having particular regard to—(i) all sectors forming part of the United Kingdom’s critical national infrastructure,(ii) digital infrastructure, including cloud services, software-as-a-service, and content delivery networks,(iii) frontier artificial intelligence models and systems, or other frontier agentic technologies,(iv) democratic processes, including election administration and registered political parties,(v) advanced manufacturing, life sciences, and critical transport equipment, and(vi) sectors of social importance, including education, research organisations, and large-scale retail distribution of essential goods other than food;(d) the institutional and regulatory framework established or otherwise affected by this Act and the NIS Regulations, including the roles and powers of the Secretary of State, designated competent authorities, the National Cyber Security Centre, the Information Commissioner, and the AI Security Institute.(4) In considering the sectors and activities currently within scope, the Secretary of State must assess—(a) whether essential activities are appropriately defined and effectively regulated, (b) whether the thresholds for regulation under the NIS Regulations, including those which exclude micro and small enterprises, leave significant risks unaddressed, and(c) how effectively risks arising in supply chains are managed.(5) In considering the regulatory system established or otherwise affected by this Act and the NIS Regulations, the Secretary of State must consider—(a) the institutional framework for the exercise of functions under this Act and the NIS Regulations, including the roles and powers of the Secretary of State, the designated competent authorities, the National Cyber Security Centre and the Information Commission, and whether that framework is the optimum framework for promoting cyber resilience across the United Kingdom,(b) the obligations to promote cyber resilience placed on—(i) persons within scope of the NIS Regulations,(ii) other organisations and sectors which could facilitate or contribute to security or operational compromises of relevant network and information systems,(iii) the developers of emerging and frontier technologies which could compromise relevant network and information systems, and(iv) organisations and sectors making a material impact on the economy, society, defence or security of the United Kingdom,(d) the powers of the AI Security Institute in relation to frontier AI systems that pose a material risk to the security or resilience of network and information systems used in essential activities—(i) to audit such systems before they are deployed or made available for use in such network and information systems,(ii) to set and review safety standards for such systems,(iii) to inspect such systems and the practices of their developers and deployers, and(iv) to require remedial action, including the suspension or restriction of the provision or deployment of a system, or to recommend that the Secretary of State do so,(e) whether the supply of cyber security professionals required to ensure security or resilience of network and information systems used in essential activities is sufficient, and(f) the obligations placed on regulated persons to report notifications of incidents, including whether the timelines and notifications are sufficient.(6) In carrying out the review, the Secretary of State must have regard to—(a) the impact that an incident affecting network and information systems relied on in the carrying on of an activity would be likely to have on the economy or the day-to-day functioning of society in the United Kingdom or any part of it,(b) the role of persons carrying on the activity in the supply of essential goods and services and in supply chains,(c) the extent to which the activity is already subject to comparable requirements relating to the security and resilience of network and information systems, and(d) the need for regulation to be proportionate, evidence-based and transparent.(7) In carrying out the review, the Secretary of State must consult—(a) the National Cyber Security Centre, (b) the Information Commission,(c) the designated competent authorities,(d) the AI Security Institute, and(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(8) On completing the review, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report setting out—(a) the findings of the review on each of the matters mentioned in subsections (2) and (3),(b) the activities (if any) which the Secretary of State intends to specify as essential activities, or otherwise to bring within the scope of the NIS Regulations, and the timetable for doing so,(c) the reasons for not bringing within scope any activity mentioned in subsection (4) or (5) which the Secretary of State does not intend to bring within scope, and(d) the changes (if any) which the Secretary of State intends to make to the regulatory system, and the timetable for doing so.(9) Where a report under subsection (10) concludes that an activity should be brought within the scope of the NIS Regulations or of regulations under section 29(1), the Secretary of State must, within six months of the report being laid—(a) lay before Parliament a draft of regulations under section 24(3) specifying that activity, or(b) lay before Parliament a statement explaining why the Secretary of State does not intend to do so.(10) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of not more than 12 months after the report under subsection (8) is laid, carry out a further review in accordance with subsections (1) to (8) and lay before Parliament a report on that review setting out the matters mentioned in subsection (10).(11) In this section—“frontier AI system” means a highly capable general-purpose artificial intelligence model or system that can perform a wide variety of tasks and matches or exceeds the capabilities of the most advanced contemporary models;“frontier agentic technology” means any machine-based system which, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments, and which—(a) can act autonomously, taking sequences of actions without human direction, and can adaptably achieve complex goals in complex environments with limited direct human supervision, and(b) has capabilities which match or exceed those present in the most advanced AI models or systems at the time.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review, within 12 months, the effectiveness of the Act and the NIS Regulations, including on sectors within scope and the regulatory framework under which the NIS Regulations operate, and the obligations that could be placed on organisations and technology providers to improve their cyber resilience.
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