Contribution
My Lords, I shall move Amendment 5 and speak to Amendments 7, 30 and 31 on the Marshalled List.
In considering the Bill, we are going to be considering some major changes to how we conduct our elections in this country. We will spend a lot of time considering the “what” of these changes and their justifiability, but we are not going to spend much time considering the “who”: who has the right to make, or not make, the changes that are being brought forward? I want to discuss that question and particularly the consequences of the devolution of the electoral franchise for all but national elections, and to suggest, as my amendments suggest, that these arrangements need to be looked at again.
I emphasise the franchise; I am not looking at the electoral system, for there has always been variation on that within the country. I am not looking at the merits of voting at 16, Commonwealth voting or anything like that. We will be coming to some of those issues where we have not discussed them already. This is about the wider consequences of allowing the devolved Governments to change the electoral franchise and the knock-on effects that that has for the wider system and the rest of the country. That is why I thought it right to table these amendments; they are probing amendments designed to get the matter discussed. Their effect would be to make the electoral franchise a reserved matter and the same in every part of the UK. In other words, they would restore the constitutional system on that point as it existed before 2013.
I will speak briefly on how these amendments would work. Amendment 30 would establish two common franchise categories: it would establish the parliamentary franchise, described as for Westminster elections and UK-wide or nationwide referendums or similar; and it would establish the local government franchise, which would apply for almost everything else. The amendment would therefore replace Scotland’s and Wales’s wider nationality qualifications. It would remove Scotland’s short-sentence prisoner exception, and it would make inconsistent legislative provisions ineffective.
Amendment 31 would go on to prevent the devolved institutions from subsequently recreating different franchises once again. It would expressly reserve for Westminster the voting entitlement in Scottish Parliament, Senedd and local elections and referendums, and polls in Scotland and Wales.
Amendments 5 and 7 seek to make the necessary consequential changes concerning detained young offenders. Amendment 5 would remove the England-only restriction on their disqualification from local government voting, and Amendment 7 seeks to delete the Northern Ireland modification that is rendered unnecessary by the earlier change. So that is how they would work.
I will say a word about the history and how we got to this point. As I noted, the devolution of franchise setting is hardly something from the dim and distant past; it is not a long-established and well-accepted part of our constitution. It goes back all of 13 years. That is why I want to examine this history in more detail.
I take Scotland first. The original devolution settlement left the franchise reserved in 1998, and the then Labour Government defended that explicitly. Lord Sewel explicitly said that the Scottish Executive
“cannot mess around with the franchise; that remains reserved”—[Official Report, 23/7/1998; col. 1077.]
That statement was not regarded as controversial, at that point. The genie was let out of the bottle only with the SNP’s determination to give itself the best chance of winning the 2014 independence referendum, and the Government consented to votes at 16 for that referendum under a special arrangement, and then agreed to it permanently in 2015.
After the referendum, the Scotland Act removed the general reservation on all but UK Parliament elections in 2017. Controversially, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee said at the time that devolving constitutional powers, including the franchise,
“risked introducing variation where there should be none”.
It identified possible differences in the enfranchisement of non-British residents and British citizens abroad—not merely the question of the voting age. It also warned that changes in Scotland could, in the end, pressure Westminster into matching them, rather than having a prior, wider, UK-wide debate on how the system should work. Those warnings were correct, but they were ignored. In 2020, the Scottish Government extended the franchise further not just to short-sentence prisoners but to all foreign residents in Scotland for everything other than national parliamentary elections.