B

Baroness Chakrabarti (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 10 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, after such a thoughtful Second Reading debate, as I hope noble Lords agree, and a great deal of engagement between Ministers and noble Lords between then and now, I have the privilege of welcoming the Committee to their places. At Second Reading, many of us were grateful to the Government for some considerable movement since the first iteration of the Bill, but, equally, many of us were concerned that somewhat more movement is required if crucial clauses of the Bill are to inspire the public trust and confidence that are so important for the criminal justice system in this jurisdiction. The context is, of course, a backlog that Governments of both stripes have struggled with and that many of us on all sides of the House principally attribute to decades of underinvestment. The context is an understanding that the right to jury trial has not been and is not absolute, and that many cases—the bulk of criminal cases—are not dealt with in the Crown Court. However, the context is also that the right to elect for a jury trial, and to have jury trials in many serious cases, is important to many people in our country. Both truths can hold at the same time. That is why this Committee is so incredibly important, and I come to it with slight anxiety, and occasionally a heavy heart, given the responsibility that we have. Alongside the point about basic legitimacy, trust and confidence, many noble Lords have expressed concerns about exposing judges, and indeed magistrates, to opprobrium in high-profile serious cases, and about the important safeguard that juries provide against the abuse of power in our current system. The first group of amendments, on mode of trial, is therefore incredibly important. It addresses the removal of the right to elect for jury trial in “either way” cases. It is unsurprising that the group contains not one but two clause stand part debates, and it is equally unsurprising that a rather exquisite quartet of noble and learned Lords will be exploring allocation guidelines, given that magistrates are to be given a new and awesome responsibility in “either way” cases. I have Amendments 1 and 3 in this group, supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and my noble friend Lady Goudie, who apologises for not being able to be here because of sad and urgent matters elsewhere. Taking the amendments in reverse order, Amendment 3 seeks to provide a right of appeal against a mode of trial decision. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has tabled Amendment 7, which takes a more detailed approach to providing such a right of appeal against a magistrate’s decision that a case will not be heard in the Crown Court, given the proposed end of the right of election. I think both of our amendments, if I may say this to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, follow the principle that important first-instance judicial decisions ought to be subject to appeal. Amendment 1, which I share with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, deals with an important and serious but unintended consequence of abolishing the right of election for jury trial. It relates, in particular, to persons of good character. A consequence of abolishing the right of election to jury trial, and of magistrates being more likely to suggest jury trial, as will be their prerogative now—they are more likely to do that if they feel that their own sentencing powers are inadequate and that the likely sentence in a case would be a longer one—is that a person with many previous convictions who would face perhaps a longer sentence for a particular offence is more likely to be allowed a jury trial than a person of hitherto untainted character with no previous convictions. Take two defendants facing the same offence—one of good character and the other with many previous convictions, perhaps serious ones and similar ones. The Bill in its current form would, in this regard, favour the person of bad character with many previous convictions and not the person of good character. That, I suggest to the Committee, must be an unintended, perverse consequence of the regime as currently drafted in the Bill. That cannot be right and fair. There are differing consequences for people of previous good character from people with many previous convictions—even though the latter may have a longer sentence, the consequences for their life, reputation and so on are perhaps different. Amendment 1 proposes not a veto for the person of previous good character but a requirement that it should at least be taken into account. Under the circumstances, it is a fairly modest request of the Government. This fairly modest amendment, which I share with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, suggests that, in such a scenario, the magistrates’ court should give particular weight to submissions by a defendant of hitherto untainted character and no previous convictions, and that that should go into the mix when considering whether they might be allowed a jury trial. That has, as noble Lords discussed at Second Reading, been our way for such a long time, and one that was cherished by so many of our people who have trust and confidence in that system. As we have discussed, so many ordinary people—not lawyers, judges or otherwise professional people—have greater trust in juries than they do in not just other parts of the criminal justice system but other parts of our institutional democracy. That is why this group is so very important. I beg to move.

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